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Executive summary 
In this report, our objective is to provide a snapshot of the current situation of the 
governance and management of migration in Hungary, the regulatory landscape, citing and 
reflecting on developments and events occurred between 2011 and 2018. Section 1) gives a 
statistical overview of international migration to Hungary. The data displayed shows the main 
patterns of asylum seeker flows, their recognition rates and the scale of people being 
expelled from the territory. We briefly describe the demographic composition of third-country 
nationals residing in the country, closing the section with a few remarks on migratory 
balance. Section 2) outlines the political, cultural and socio-economic context in which 
migration management enfolds. It briefly introduces the linguistic and religious cleavages 
and the political and institutional arrangements of the state. Without engaging in a thorough 
analysis, we will try to pin down those critical socio-economic and political factors that are 
accountable for the current escalation of tensions. In doing so, we move on to Section 3) that 
gives an insight on how the constitutional organization of the state has been altered and 
restructured over the past years, thus establishing an ideological, legal and institutional base 
for the transformation of the migration and asylum framework. Section 4) accounts for the 
legislative and institutional framework of immigration and asylum by introducing the major 
Acts that govern the field, the authorities that are responsible for the implementation of the 
policy, and the Government’s migration strategy. Since the recent developments 
fundamentally changed the scope of the framework, now representing its basic tenets, 
instead of discussing the amendments in a separate section, the refugee crisis driven 
reforms will be embedded here. In chronological order we will address all major 
amendments since 2015 that affected the legislative framework. Section 5) explains the legal 
status of foreigners, including asylum applicants, beneficiaries of international protection, the 
main categories of third country nationals legally residing in the country in terms of the type 
of residence permit they hold, irregular migrants, and unaccompanied minors. In describing 
the situation of asylum seekers, we will outline the first main stages of the application 
procedure. Reception conditions and detention of asylum seekers, however, being subject of 
another work package of the project, are out of the scope of the report. Finally, in Section 6) 
we will analyse the national framework compliance with the European Convention on Human 










HORIZON 2020 – RESPOND (770564) – HUNGARY 
7 
1. Statistics and data overview 
Asylum seekers 
The first significant number of asylum seekers since the Balkan War arrived in Hungary in 
the winter 2014/2015. They were Kosovars, who only transited through Hungary on their way 
towards Germany (Kékesi, 2017). Partly due to the worsening socio-economic situation and 
political deadlock in Kosovo, tens of thousands people have left the country (Alexander, 
2015). According to Nagy, the reason for Afghans being one of the three largest groups is 
because the local networks/smuggling routes are arguably well established, since their 
arrival to Hungary goes back to 1990s (Nagy, 2016a). As the table shows, the situation 
escalated when the Syrian asylum seekers reached the border in 2015, and the authorities 
registered more than 177,000 asylum applications in total.  
Table 1. Asylum applications 2011-2017 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Application, 
total 














































Refugee 52 87 198 240 146 154 106 
Subsidiary 
Protection 
139 328 217 236 356 271 1,110 
Tolerated 
Stay 
14 47 4 7 6 7 75 
Rejection 740 751 4,185 4,553 2,917 4,675 2,880 
Termination 623 1,110 11,339 23,406 152,260 49,479 2,049 
  Source: Nagy, 2016a; IAO;1 CSO2 
In early 2015, most of the arrivals were men under the age of 20 (70-80%) (WHO, 2016). 
Over the year this pattern changed, and greater number of women and children arrived. 
Concerning single men, the age range also expanded to include younger, unaccompanied 
minors (UAMs), as well as older males (WHO, 2016). In 2016, 6,599 women and 8,551 
children, of which 1221 UAMs (ECRE,2017:8), last year 1,241 women and 1,596 children, of 
which 232 UAMs, applied for asylum (ECRE, 2018:8). 
                                               
 
1 Statistics of the Immigration and Asylum Office (IAO), Available at: 
http://www.bmbah.hu/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&layout=item&id=492&Itemid=1259&lang
=en.  
2 Statistics of the Central Statistical Office (CSO), Available at: 
https://www.ksh.hu/stadat_annual_1. 
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Recognition rates, especially in comparison to the EU average, have been extremely low; 
termination decisions are the most dominant. As Nagy notes, between January 2014 and 
June 2016, 215,322 cases were closed without decision on merits. Termination refers to 
situations when the applicant absconds or withdraws the application. Other grounds for 
termination such as death of applicant or change of immigration status hardly ever occur 
(Nagy, 2016a). 
Although not visible in annual breakdown, the construction of the fence3 at the Serbian-
Hungarian border in September 2015, and its later extension along the Croatian section, 
resulted in a massive decrease in asylum applications. From September to October the total 
number of applications dropped from 30,795 to 615.4 The fence did not deter asylum 
seekers from coming, it only diverted the entire Western Balkan route towards Croatia, and 
created a domino effect of border closures throughout the Balkan (Trauner and Neelsen, 
2017:180-183). Moreover, the Hungarian authorities transported thousands of asylum 
seekers to the Austrian border without registration in September 2015.5   
Expulsions 
Table 2. Expulsions 2011-2017 
 2011  2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Expulsions 1,904  2,039 1,352 1,962 2,603 3,274 1,057 
    Source: IAO 
Since the Government criminalised illegal entry, as of 15 September 2015, expulsion of the 
illegal border crossers has been mandatory.6 Until 30 November 2016, 2,843 people were 
convicted for ‘unauthorised crossing of the border closure’.7 The decrease of 2017 may be 
accounted for by an amendment to the Act on the State Border that came into force 5 July 
2016. The new provision provided for the police to automatically push back undocumented 
migrants apprehended within 8 km of the Serbian/Croatian-Hungarian border, rendering their 
arrest and conviction ‘unnecessary’. In March 2017, this rule has become applicable to the 
entire territory of Hungary. Under the new rule, in 2016, 19,057 migrant were refused entry 
or escorted back to the other side of the fence (ECRE, 2017:17-18); the number reached 
20,100 in 2017.8  
                                               
 
3 See Section 4 of this report. 
4 Asylum and first time asylum applications by citizenship, age and sex Monthly data (rounded), 
Eurostat, Avalable at: http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/submitViewTableAction.do.  
5 See VS. Available at: https://vs.hu/kozelet/osszes/tizezer-menekultet-engedhettunk-at-a-
ausztriaba-regisztracio-nelkul1-0920.    
6 See Section 4 of this report. 
7 HHC, Hungary: Key Asylum Figures as of 1 December 2016. Available at: 
https://www.helsinki.hu/wp-content/uploads/HHC-Hungary-asylum-figures-1-December-2016.pdf.   
8 HHC, Hungary: Key Asylum Figures for 2017, Available at: https://www.helsinki.hu/wp-
content/uploads/HHC-Hungary-asylum-figures-1-January-2018.pdf.   
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Foreign citizens residing in Hungary 
In 2011, there were 206,909 foreign citizens residing in the country, which decreased to 
141,357 in 2013, a share of 1,4% of the population. It has remained fairly stable, although 
last year statistics show 7% increase. Regarding the foreign-born population, the number 
was 383,236 (4%) in 2011, which raised to 4,3% in 2013. Unlike in most EU Member States, 
where the majority of the foreigner population are third country nationals, in Hungary they 
made up just over 40% (Gödri, 2015:199). The largest group of third country nationals, 
approximately 26% of the total foreign population, come from Asia, mainly from China (12%). 
The share of males and females is generally balanced among them. Men are slightly over-
represented concerning Serbia, while more women arrived from Ukraine and Russia.9 These 
immigrants are characterised by a younger age composition, more than half of them aged 
between 20 and 39 years (Gödri, 2015:191). 
Foreigners in Hungary are concentrated in three main settlements. 80% of the Chinese 
immigrants live in Budapest (Kováts, 2016:357). In general, most of the foreigners live in the 
capital and Pest county, although people from neighbouring countries prefer the border 
areas. The Balaton is a favourable destination among elderly generations (Kincses, 2014).  
Migratory balance 
Between 2011 and 2013, there was a rapid growth in emigration. Although the process 
somewhat slowed in 2013, the overall number of people living abroad has been constantly 
increasing (Gödri, 2015). Neither the Central Statistical Office, however, nor other authorities 
publish data on the emigration of Hungarian citizens (Gödri et al, 2014:7,25). Based on 
aggregate mirror statistics of 2017, the number of Hungarians resident in other EU Member 
States is about 600.000. The most popular destination countries are the UK (250.000), 
Germany (192.340) and Austria (72.390).10 The reasons are mainly the absence of 
economic growth, low wages and the difficulties of young generations to enter the labour 
market. Although the official statistics show positive net migration rate, according to the 
mirror statistics, Hungary has become an emigration rather than an immigration country 
(Gödri, 2015). Emigrants who fail to inform the National Health Service and de-register from 
the system may face a fine up to 100,000 HUF (€320). In case of self-employed persons, the 




                                               
 
9 See CSO statistics, Available at: 
https://www.ksh.hu/docs/eng/xstadat/xstadat_annual/i_wnvn001b.html.  
10 Portfolio, ‘Ide vezetett a tömeges kivándorlás: több magyar lépett le, mint gondoltuk, 30 August 
2017, Available at: https://www.portfolio.hu/gazdasag/ide-vezetett-a-tomeges-kivandorlas-tobb-
magyar-lepett-le-mint-gondoltuk.260665.html.  
11 Art 80(5)-(6) of Act LXXXIII of 1997 on the Benefits of Compulsory Health Insurance.  
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2. The socio-economic, cultural and political context 
Although the unemployment rate has been constantly decreasing in Hungary since 2010, it 
was way over the EU average in 2011, only Greece was behind Hungary in the list (Gödri et 
al, 2014:46). The decrease, instead of an economic boom, is in large part attributable to the 
controversial and inadequate public works scheme (Albert, 2017), the growing number of 
persons working abroad,12 and the raise of the official retirement age (Scharle, 2016). The 
Human Development Index (HDI) for 2015 was 0.836, which means an increase of 18.9% 
since the end of the communist era. The life expectancy increased by 6% and the GNI per 
capita by about 46.3%. This value still remained below the average of 0.887 for the OECD 
area, including that of the fellow post-communist countries, Poland, Czech Republic and 
Slovakia. For every 100.000 live births, 17 women died from pregnancy related causes. The 
Gender Inequality Index (GII) was 0,252; female participation in the labour market was 
46.4% compared to 62.5% for men, the percentage of seats in the Parliament held by 
women was 10.1 (UNDP, 2016).     
According to the last census in 2011, 39% of the population were Catholic (of which 1,8% 
Greek Catholic), 11,6% Calvinist, 2,2% Evangelical, and only 0,1% Muslim and 0,1% 
Jewish. 27,2 % did not declare a religion, and 18,2 % answered they had none.13  
In November 2016, Ásotthalom, a village of Southern Hungary, adopted an anti-Muslim 
legislation forbidding inter alia the wearing of the burka.14 In June 2017, the Constitutional 
Court overturned the ban for violating the right to the freedom of conscience and religion, 
and to the freedom of speech. It is, however, important to note that three judges of the Court 
stressed in their concurring opinion that there is an “apparent risk for the Islamisation of 
Europe”, and the Court made its decision merely on procedural grounds and did not go on to 
consider whether it would be possible to order such a ban at the appropriate legislative 
level.15 
It is also notable, that as a consequence of the adoption of the 2011 Church Act, several 
religious communities previously registered as Churches lost their status as such. The 
ECtHR in Magyar Keresztény Mennonita Egyház and Others v. Hungary ruled that this 
amounted to a violation of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, as well 
as to the right to freedom of association. To date, both the provisions of the Church Act in 
question and their legal basis in the Constitution remain intact, no necessary measures were 
implemented to remedy the breach of the Convention.16  
                                               
 
12 People having been worked abroad less than a year are included into the employment 
statistics, as well as those occasionally returning and contributing to the family budget. 
13 See Central Statistical Office, Census 2011, Available at: 
http://www.ksh.hu/nepszamlalas/tablak_vallas.  
14 HVG, Toroczkai odacsap a bevándorlóknak: megtiltják a mecsetépítést Ásotthalmon, [Online] 
Available at: http://hvg.hu/itthon/20161124_toroczkai_asotthalom_muszlim_tiltas. 
15 See 7/2017. (IV.18.) AB.   
16 For further information on the issue, see  Forum for Religious Freedom -  Europe, ‘Hungary: 
Two years after ruling by ECtHR Church Law remains unaltered’, Warsaw, 27 September 2016, 
Avalaible at: http://www.osce.org/odihr/268711?download=true.  
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The official language of Hungary is the Hungarian, the first language of some 99% of the 
population. The second largest linguistic group is the Romani and Boyash.17 Roma make up 
the largest minority group as well as the most marginalised in Hungary. Empirical research 
estimates 650.000 Roma people living in the country.18 After Roma, the most populous 
groups are Germans, Romanians and Slovakians, non-indigenous ethnic minorities are 
mostly Russians, Chinese, Arabs and Vietnamese (Gödri et al, 2014:41-44). 
Concerning internal migration flows, the spatial redistribution of the local population, the 
most popular destinations are traditionally Budapest and Pest county. In 2011, 29,6% of the 
entire population (9,982,000) lived here.19 Fejér and Győr-Moson-Sopron counties have 
positive migration balance, while only a few people move to Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén, 
Szabolcs-Szatmár, Békés and Baranya counties (Bálint and Gödri, 2015). These patterns 
are not accidental, the employment rate is the highest in the western and central part of the 
country. 
Hungary is a parliamentary representative democracy. The legislative power is vested in the 
Parliament. The executive Government, accountable to the Parliament, is led by the Prime 
Minister. As the head of the state, the President mostly performs ceremonial functions, may 
however veto a law passed by the Parliament by sending it to the Constitutional Court for 
review. The members of the Parliament are elected to a 4-year term.20 The current Assembly 
comprises the governing center-right21 Fidesz party in alliance22 with the KDNP (Cristian 
democrats), and the Jobbik (far-right), MSZP (socialists), and the LMP (green-liberals) in 
opposition. Although the Fidesz-KDNP coalition lost its two-thirds majority after a by-election 
defeat in February 2015, the governing parties have dominated and controlled the legislative 
process ever since (see more on that in Section 3). 
Migration history in a nutshell - unfolding demographic 
nationalism 
Before 1980, Hungary was a ‘closed country’. The political and societal transformation in 
Southeastern Europe starting in the late 1980’s changed the status quo, immigration and 
transit migration were intensified. Immigrants, most of whom were ethnic Hungarian, arrived 
mainly from the neighbouring countries, Romania, Ukraine and Yugoslavia. With the 
introduction of the right to free travel abroad in January 1988, out-migration has also 
                                               
 
17 See Central Statistical Office, Census 2011, Available at: 
http://www.ksh.hu/nepszamlalas/tablak.  
18 In the 2011 eleven census 316,000 people claimed to belong this group, however many Roma 
identify themselves as Hungarian denying their real Roma identity – see Simon cited in Timmer AD 
(2016) Educating the Hungarian Roma: Nongovernmental Organisations and Minority Rights, London: 
Lexington Books, p31. 
19 Központi Statisztikai Hivatal, 2011. Évi Népszámlálás: 1. előzetes adatok, Budapest, 2012. 
Available at: https://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xftp/idoszaki/nepsz2011/nepszelo2011.pdf.  
20 Next general election is scheduled for 8 April 2018.  
21 In reality, the Fidesz has rather become a radical authoritarian party with a dominant national 
populist overtone – See Krekó P and Juhász A (2017) The Hungarian Far Right: Social Demand, 
Political Supply and International Context, Stuttgart: Ibidem.  
22 This is a formally coalition government with no significant role assigned to KDNP. 
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emerged. Hungary faced significant migration flows during the Bosnian War in the early 
1990s, when over 100,000 people, also ethnic Bosnians, Croats, Serbs, Albanians and 
Roma refugees, former-Yugoslav citizens, were settled in the country. In the meantime, 
although in a small proportion, non-European groups, notably Chinese and some Middles 
Eastern nationals, took advantage of the collapsing socialist economy and opened small 
businesses, fast food buffets, restaurants or clothing stores in Budapest. With Hungary’s 
accession to the EU in 2004, both inward and outward migration gained a new impetus. The 
number of registered immigrants was over 25,000 in 2005, reaching 35,000 in 2008. The 
new rules on immigration introduced in 2007 allowed EEA citizens to more easily obtain 
long-term residence permits. Between 2009 and 2012 there was a decline in numbers, partly 
because the Government introduced a simplified naturalisation procedure available for 
foreign nationals of Hungarian origin, residing not only in, but also outside Hungary. This 
procedure applies to anyone who can evidence having had an ancestor living in Hungarian 
territory and who can speak Hungarian with a certain level of fluency. In the first four years of 
the implementation, 670.000 people have completed the registration (Gyurok, 1994; Gödri et 
al, 2014; Gödri, 2015). The number of the new Hungarian citizens under the program 
reached one million in December 2017.23  
In the April 8th 2018 general election, Hungarian citizens without a Hungarian address 
(mainly ethnic Hungarians living in neighbouring countries) were eligible to register and vote 
by mail - as opposed to residents of Hungary who were abroad at the time of the election. 
This latter group could exercise their right to vote only at a chosen consulate personally. 
Thus, many were forced to travel hundreds of kilometres to participate in the election.24 
In the last two decades, Hungary developed a hierarchy of immigration policies. On one 
hand, the Government privileges and endorses links with ethnic Hungarians living in 
neighbouring countries. Unlike other countries, however, it does in a way that shows a 
symbolic, quasi revisionist attempt of nation building across borders, with the aim of 
maintaining the “cultural legacies” and “spiritual unity” of the historical Hungary in claiming 
responsibility for the Hungarians living abroad.25 On the other hand, regarding third-country 
nationals from non-neighbouring countries, Hungary has adopted a less supportive policy in 
failing to establish a coherent integration strategy and maintaining a discriminative, if not 
segregating practices in the institutionalisation of migration: they receive no state support, 
such as vocational, language training or housing benefits, and issues of cultural diversity and 
the notion of mutual recognition is disregarded in certain settings, even in education 
(Melegh, 2016; Ceccorulli et al, 2017). Irrespective of the relatively small number of non-
ethnic Hungarian immigrants in the country, “foreignness-aversive” discourses have been 
constantly bolstering xenophobic feelings towards them (Korkut, 2014).  
                                               
 
23 Bloomberg, ‘Hungary Citizenship Plan Reaches 1 Million Mark in Boost for Orban’, [Online] 
Available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-15/trump-s-next-big-idea-to-save-
coal-is-miniature-power-plants/.  
24 HVG, ‘Nem változtat a külföldön élők szavazásán a kormány’ [Online] Available at: 
http://hvg.hu/itthon/20170831_Nem_valtoztat_a_kuloldon_elok_szavazasan_a_kormany.  
25 The purposes are electoral rather than irredentist - See Pogonyi Sz (2015) Transborder Kin-
minority as Symbolic Resource in Hungary, Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, 
14(3): 73-98. 
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In parallel, outward migration of Hungarians has not only become significant, but also 
particularly high among the skilled and young population; doctors, health care professionals, 
engineers, technical workers. Labour shortages have already become prevalent in certain 
professions (Hárs, 2016) with about 200,000 vacant positions in the labour market.26 The 
brain drain effect has also had an impact on higher education, with more and more students 
planning to get a degree abroad (Gödri et al, 2014). Moreover, there is an “unequal 
exchange” between emigrants and immigrants, the latter flows do not counterbalance the 
former (Melegh, 2015; 2016). These patterns and the otherwise aging and shrinking 
population cause significant loss of welfare contribution putting the sustainability of the 
pension system in peril, and the economy already shows signs of dependence on migrant 
remittance (Földházi, 2015; Böröcz, 2014). The Government has so far failed to adequately 
address these demographic challenges and their associated negative social and financial 
consequences. Instead of enhancing demographic revitalisation through structural reforms, 
the Government has focused on non-Western, illegal migration flows supposedly threatening 
the already fragile welfare-system (Melegh, 2016). Right-wing populism has dominated the 
domestic political scene since the end of the 2000s (Ádám and Bozóki, 2016), and with it a 
climate of mistrust towards third-country nationals, and in this sense Hungary demonstrates 
how securitisation of migration has never been unfamiliar to EU migration policy as a whole 
(Huysmans, 2006; Baldaccini et al, 2007; Karamanidou, 2015). In Hungary, however, as 
Melegh argues, a radical and “authoritarian version of nationalism” has emerged and 
become mainstream, to some extent, possibly because of the serious demographic and 
migration-related challenges the country is facing (Melegh, 2016). Non-supportive 
institutional attitudes have turned into social exclusion and hostility, sentiments that reached 
their peak during the refugee crisis. In 2015/2016, the Government claimed “ethic 
homogeneity” in demolishing the asylum system, while presenting itself as the defender of 
the nation and “European Christianity” (Fekete, 2016). The Government exploited the crisis 
for political purposes to justify its opposition of the elitist liberalism of the West (Korkut, 
2012), that was, yet again, politically manifested with the so-called lenient politics of Brussels 
in tackling the migrant crisis. The Prime Minister claimed that only the reconstruction of 
polities along Christian and national, rather than liberal, principles can save Europe. To 
understand the Government’s rhetoric, it is important to note that Christianity is embraced by 
Fidesz as a question of national identity and not as religion, as Brubaker phrased it: “a 
matter of belonging rather than believing” (Brubaker, 2017). In the Hungarian political 
discourse, Christianity has been reconstructed in a way that it is lacking religious references, 
and serves as marker of traditional nationalism. Combined with the memories of “a proud 
past”, it is utilised to unify and elevate the nation, thus legitimising illiberal and anti-
democratic practices (Ádám and Bozóki, 2016). A political asset that enables Fidesz (and 
the Jobbik) to mainstream their agendas on both issues of Europeanisation and migration 
(Korkut, 2015). 
In reflecting these arguments, in the next section we will briefly outline how the constitutional 
order and organization of the state has been altered and restructured since 2011, thus 
                                               
 
26 Portfolio, ‘Megszólaltak a cégvezetők Már majdnem mindenkit elért Magyarország legnagyobb 
problémája, [Online] Available at: https://www.portfolio.hu/gazdasag/megszolaltak-a-cegvezetok-mar-
majdnem-mindenkit-elert-magyarorszag-legnagyobb-problemaja.278965.html.  
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providing an ideological, normative and institutional base for the transformation of the 
asylum/migration framework. 
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3. The constitutional organization of the state, separation 
of powers and constitutional principles on immigration and 
asylum 
Checks and balances 
Hungary has a unicameral parliament. While badly designed unicameral systems may fail to 
provide a credible control over the government (Constitution Unit, 1998), Hungary’s 1989 
Constitution ensured an appropriate system of checks and balances. All this changed when 
the 2010 parliamentary election gave a qualified majority enough to Fidesz-KDNP to rewrite 
the Constitution. Fidesz expressed the necessity of a new Constitution to enhance 
democracy, and to demolish the elitist and partocratic scope of the 1989 Constitution. The 
2011 “Fundamental Law”, the new Constitution, however, led to regression in both terms 
(Korkut, 2012). As of 1 January 2012, the then well-balanced legislative decision making 
process has been dismantled, and was replaced by a centralised executive control; 
“Hungary has become a constitutional democracy in name only”, in fact, Hungary has 
become a “guided” and “broken” democracy (Bánkuti et al, 2012; Korkut, 2014; Bozóki, 
2015).  
Fidesz laid down a constitutional order where appointments to key offices, 
independent institutions and parliamentary committees crucial to democracy and to checks 
on parliamentary procedure, no longer require multi-party consultation or representation. 
Positions such as the Chief Prosecutor, Head of the State Auditor and the Budget Council, 
members of the Electoral Commission, judges of the Constitutional Court, the President of 
the National Media and Info-communications Authority or the National Bank are all 
unilaterally27 elected by the Fidesz-controlled Parliament (Bánkuti et al, 2012). 
In practice, each and every piece of new legislation has been crafted and approved 
by one party only. Even cardinal laws governing the basic rules of taxation, pensions, and 
the electoral system have been crafted in a way to reflect the policy preferences of the ruling 
Fidesz party. Laws are passed without adequate debate on the floor, impact assessment, or 
without consultation with expert groups or stakeholders.28 Although the President of the 
Republic is responsible for preliminary norm control and to review the constitutionality of a 
law proposal, the position has been filled by former Fidesz party leaders, previously Pál 
Schmitt and now János Áder (Bánkuti et al, 2012). Schmitt signed every law the Parliament 
passed without objection. 
Structure and independence of the judiciary 
The new constitution and its amendments introduced changes that raised serious concerns 
about the independence of judiciary (IBAHRI, 2012). The ‘Fundamental Law’, even more so, 
                                               
 
27 With two-third majority of the Members present.  
28 European Parliament Report on the Situation of Fundamental Rights: standards and practices 
in Hungary, pursuant to the European Parliament of 16 February 2012, 2012/2130 (INI), Committee 
on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs. 
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the subsequent Act on the Organization and Administration of Courts of Hungary29 and the 
Act on the Legal Status and Remuneration of Judges30 have brought a radical reconstruction 
of the judicial system.  
The Hungarian judiciary comprises of four levels: The Kúria (The Supreme Court of 
Hungary), the regional courts of appeal, regional courts, administrative and labour courts, 
and the district courts. District courts hear criminal and civil cases in the first instance. 
Administrative and labour courts, as regional level courts, review decisions in the first 
instance relating to administrative and employment law. Regional courts are second instance 
courts but also hear special first instance cases where the law so provides. The regional 
courts of appeal hear appeals filed against the decisions of the regional courts. On the top of 
the hierarchy, as the highest judicial body of Hungary, The Kúria hears appeals filed against 
the decision of the regional courts and regional courts of appeal, and ensures the uniform 
application of the law. It adopts law harmonising decisions with binding force to all other 
courts, publishes decisions on legal principles, and annuls local authority decrees that are 
incompatible with these decisions and the law.31  
Disregarding his 17 years of experience as a judge of the ECtHR, the new 
‘Fundamental Law’ deemed the sitting president of the Kúria, András Baka unqualified, and 
his mandate was terminated. His replacement was elected by the two-thirds majority vote of 
the (Fidesz-KDNP) Parliament. In Baka v. Hungary (App. No. 20261/12) the ECtHR later 
held that the premature termination of Mr Baka’s mandate without providing judicial review 
violated art 6(1) of the Convention. The Court furthermore found a violation of the right to 
freedom of expression (Art 10), given the casual link between the termination of the 
applicant’s mandate and his previous criticism concerning the constitutional and legislative 
reforms. 
The central administration of courts, a task that previously belonged to National 
Judicial Council (NJC), has been transferred to the President of National Office of Judiciary 
(NOJ), who was elected by the supermajority of the Parliament for a 9-year period. The Act 
attaches significantly more weight to the President as opposed to the members of the 
Council. The President exercises most prerogatives of the administration including the 
appointment of judges to senior judicial positions. Moreover, until its annulment, Art 27(4) of 
the ‘Fundamental Law’ authorised the President to allocate and reassign cases from one 
court to another.32 The NJC only retained a nominal supervisory role. The judges of the 
Council have very limited power and influence on actual decisions, their opinions and 
proposals can be ignored, their decisions are not binding. These changes in the institutional 
structure and the strong personal leadership under which the Office was set up met fierce 
criticism, focusing on the current system’s lack of judicial self-governance and issues relating 
to accountability (Venice Commission, 2012; Fleck, 2013). Critics raised alarms about the 
potential danger of political interference with independent judiciary, since the first President 
of the Office is the wife of a founding member of Fidesz (Badó, 2013).      
                                               
 
29 Act CLXI of 2011. 
30 Act CLXII of 2011. 
31 See http://birosag.hu/en/information/hungarian-judicial-system.  
32 The Fifth Amendment annulled Art 27(4) of the Fundamental Law, previously introduced by Art 
14 of the Fourth Amendment. 
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Finally, the Fundamental Law excessively lowered the mandatory retirement age of 
judges (from 70 to 62 years), forcing some 270 judges into retirement. The new law met 
fierce criticism as it undermines the security of judicial tenure,33 let alone the risk of “political 
capture” given the extraordinary power of the President of the NJO to fill in the vacant 
positions (IBAHRI, 2015:26-27). 
On 26 March 2018, the first instance court ruled that the President of the NJO 
abused her power in declining the application of a judge for a senior judicial post.34   
Packing and weakening the Constitutional Court 
Prior to the introduction of the Fundamental Law, in June 2010, the Fidesz-dominated 
Parliament amended the old Constitution in order to alter the procedure for electing 
members of the Constitutional Court. Nomination by the majority of all parties in the 
Parliament is no longer needed before election, the only requirement is an overall two-thirds 
parliamentary vote. In September 2011, the number of judges of the Court was increased 
from 11 to 15. As of now, all judges on the bench were elected after June 2010, each 
nominated by the governing parties.35 Unlike ‘regular’ judges, members of the Constitutional 
Court may remain in their seats until the end of their 12-year term, their upper age limit has 
been abolished (Eötvös Károly Policy Institute et al, 2013b). 
The Fundamental Law curtailed the review jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court over 
budgetary and tax issues. The Court may only review such issues in relation to ‘the right to 
life and human dignity, protection of personal data, freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion’ or the rights related to Hungarian citizenship’, and do so only if the state debt 
exceeds half of the GDP.36 The reasons for setting such criteria are, arguably, politically 
motivated: the Court has previously abolished tax and financial measures with reference to 
principles that are not in the list (Kovács and Tóth, 2011; Lembcke and Boulanger, 
2012:283). Moreover, in March 2013, the Fourth Amendment annulled the entire case law 
prior to the entry into force of the Fundamental Law, and provided that the Court may review 
amendments to the Fundamental Law on procedural grounds only. This latter amendment 
was, arguably, necessary since the Court, a few months earlier, abolished a provision of the 
so-called “Transitional Provisions” of the Constitution that provided legal basis for a radical 
and highly controversial change in the structure and registration of churches in Hungary,37 
however, technically restored by the Fourth Amendment (Eötvös Károly Policy Institute et al, 
2013a). Such restrictions of the Court’s competence received severe criticism, including that 
                                               
 
33 In European Commission v Hungary (C-286/12), the CJEU found the law discriminatory, and 
ruled that Hungary failed to fulfil obligations under Directive 2000/78/EC on equal treatment in 
employment and occupation. 
34 Budapest Beacon, ‘Court rules: Handó abused her power’ [Online] Available: 
https://budapestbeacon.com/court-rules-hando-abused-her-power/.  
35 The last election of four members to fill newly vacant positions due to retirement of former 
judges was in November 2016. Since the Fidesz-KDNP lost its two-thirds majority in February 2015, 
for the nomination they made alliance with LMP (Green Liberals).  
36 Art 37(4) of Fundamental Law. 
37 See p12 of this report and Constitutional Court Decision 45/2012. (XII. 29.). 
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of László Sólyom, the former President of the Constitutional Court, who stated: “we are back 
from where the Court started in 1989.”38 
Rights protection 
The Fundamental Law has been criticised for failing to properly guarantee fundamental 
human rights, on the basis of being both anti-egalitarian and lacking in explicit protection of 
minorities (Kovács, 2012). By changing the original “We the people” formula to “We the 
members of the Hungarian nation”, the Preamble implies an ethnic connotation. Besides 
being problematic in inter-state relations for a potential revisionist interpretation, it also 
excludes “nationalities living with us” (non-ethnic Hungarian citizens of Hungary) from the 
enactment of the Constitution (Venice Commission, 2011:para 40,149; Körtvélyesi, 2012). 
The Fundamental Law’s concept of human dignity fails to represent an inherent quality 
acknowledged for all human beings. In attributing constitutive role to Christianity, it is “loaded 
with religious and family values” whilst restricts women’s dignity, autonomy and privacy (Kis, 
2012; Dupré, 2012). Since its birth, the carved-in-granite constitution has gone through a 
number of amendments, very few of which remained without comments condemning the 
new provisions for, inter alia, their incompatibility with EU law, criminalising homelessness, 
restricting the right to vote,39 narrowing the notion of family, violating the freedom of religion, 
and undermining the rule of law.40  
As of January 2012, the National Agency for Data Protection and Freedom of 
Information was established. The prior independent Data Protection Ombudsman was 
substituted by the head of the new authority, nominated by the Prime Minister and appointed 
by the President of the Republic.41 The offices of the Commissioner for Citizens’ Rights, the 
Commissioner for National and Ethnic Minority Rights and the Commissioner for Future 




39 The criticised provisions of the Second Amendment that required preliminary registration for 
participation in national elections were later abolished by the Constitutional Court on procedural 
grounds (45/2012 (XII. 29.) AB.). 
40 European Parliament Report on the Situation of Fundamental Rights: standards and practices 
in Hungary, pursuant to the European Parliament of 16 February 2012, 2012/2130 (INI), Committee 
on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A7-2013-
0229+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN; Eötvös Károly Policy Institute, HHC and the Hungarian Civil Liberties 
Union, Joint Opinion, Main concerns regarding the Fourth Amendment to the Fundamental Law of 
Hungary, 26 February 2013, Available at: https://helsinki.hu/wp-
content/uploads/Appendix_1_Main_concerns_regarding_the_4th_Amendment_to_the_Fundamental_
Law_of_Hungary.pdf; Venice Commission, Opinion on the Fourth Amendment to the Fundamental 
Law of Hungary, Venice, 14-15 June 2013, Available at: 
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=cdl-ad(2013)012-e; European 
Commission, The European Commission reiterates its serious concerns over the Fourth Amendment 
to the Constitution of Hungary. Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-327_en.htm.  
41 Concerning the independence of the data protection authority, in European Commission v 
Hungary (C-288/12) the CJEU found that Hungary failed to fulfil obligations under Directive 95/46/EC 
on the Protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data. 
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Generations have been merged into one single office of the Commissioner for Fundamental 
Rights,42 who remained silent during the entire migration crisis. 
The European Committee of Social Rights in its latest country report listed the 
following shortcomings of the Hungarian framework and issues of legislative non-conformity 
with the European Social Charter:43  
• Insufficient access to social services for lawfully resident nationals of all State 
Parties; 
• Inadequate supply of housing for vulnerable families; evicted and Roma 
families can be left homelessness; 
• Roma children are subject to segregation in the educational field; 
• Inadequate level of social assistance paid to single person without resources 
including elderly persons; 
• Inadequate minimum amount of old-age pensions, jobseeker’s aid/allowance, 
rehabilitation and invalidity benefits; 
• Workers are not protected by occupational health and safety regulations; 
• Insufficient measures taken to reduce the maternal mortality; 
• Persons with disabilities are not guaranteed an effective and equal access to 
employment and mainstream training.44       
Constitutional entrenchment of the principle of asylum and 
case law 
As set out in the Fundamental Law: “No one shall be expelled or extradited to a State where 
he or she would be in danger of being sentenced to death, being tortured or being subjected 
to other inhuman treatment or punishment”.45 As McBride points out, this provision neither 
includes the risk of being subjected to treatment that is degrading,46 nor does it provide 
protection against expulsion where there is a risk of an unjustified deprivation of liberty, and 
unfair trial. All of which have been recognized by the ECtHR as requiring a High Contracting 
Party not to expose an individual to such a risk through his or her deportation or expulsion 
(McBride, 2012). Moreover, the Fundamental Law provides that noncitizens shall be granted 
asylum only if another country does not provide protection for them.47 
                                               
 
42 Art 15 and 16 of the Transnational Provisions to the Fundamental Law. 
43 Department of the European Social Charter, Directorate General of Human Rights and the 
Rule of Law, Hungary and the European Social Charter, January 2018. Avalable at: 
https://rm.coe.int/16805ac0a9.  
44 Further information on the situation of non-conformity is available at: 
http://hudoc.esc.coe.int/eng#{"fulltext":["hungary"],"ESCDcType":["FOND","Conclusion","Ob"]}.  
45 Art XIV(2) of The Fundamental Law of Hungary. 
46 See Art 3 of ECHR.  
47 Art XIV(3) of The Fundamental Law of Hungary. 
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In June 2016, the Parliament (Fidesz-KDNP and the far-right Jobbik party) introduced 
the Sixth Amendment to the Fundamental Law.48 The new provision enables the Parliament, 
at the initiative of the Government, to declare a “state of terror threat” in the event of a 
“significant and direct threat of a terrorist attack” with a two-thirds majority vote of the 
members present. The Government may introduce extraordinary measures that derogate 
from or suspend regular procedures prescribed by law governing matters of public 
administration, defence and law-enforcement forces, security services, as well as 
procedures laid down in cardinal Acts. The exceptional measures introduced and carried out 
during ‘state of terrorist threat’ neither require parliamentary oversight nor judicial 
authorisation. The adopted provision only requires the Government to keep the President of 
the Republic and the designated parliamentary committees “informed” (Kovács, 2016).  
In addition, there is the complete lack of definition provided for what constitutes “threat of 
terrorist attack” (Amnesty International, 2016a). A couple of weeks before the amendment 
proposal was released, the Minister of the Prime Minister’s Office, nevertheless, referred to 
the clashes occurred at Röszke border crossing49 in 2015 as a quasi “terror threat situation” 
(Kovács, 2016). In fact, one of the participants was arrested and sentenced to 10 years 
imprisonment for terrorism on 30 November 2016 (Amnesty International, 2016b).    
 
In October 2016, Hungary held a referendum whether to comply with the European Council 
decision 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 on the mandatory relocation of refugees. Despite 
the Government ‘NO’-campaign, the referendum was invalid due to insufficient turnout 
(Halmai, 2016). Shortly after the failed referendum, the Minister of Justice submitted an 
amendment proposal (Seventh Amendment) to the Fundamental Law, according to which no 
“foreign population” could be settled in Hungary. Although the draft proposal was rejected, it 
was a clear attempt of the Government to circumvent and derogate from obligations under 
EU law, with reference to Hungary’s “constitutional identity” (Nagy-Nádasi and Kőhalmi, 
2017; Halmai, 2017). 
 
Regarding the asylum status determination procedure, appeals against rejection are dealt 
with at the administrative and labour courts by single judges, who are typically not asylum 
specialists (ECRE, 2017:22). The short notice deadlines50 provided for submitting a judicial 
review requests, let alone during “state of crisis due to mass migration”, arguably constitute 
serious shortcomings of administrative justice. Moreover, the court’s right to change the 
decision of the Immigration and Asylum Office (IAO) has been revoked in September 2015, 
and the decisions passed by the court cannot be challenged by way of a second appeal. 
Although the law foresees the possibility of constitutional review of administrative matters in 
general, the effectiveness of the complaint mechanism is questionable. The Constitutional 
Court’s case law shows that very few appeals are admitted and adjudicated on the merits 
(Gárdos-Orosz and Temesi, 2017). 
                                               
 
48 Art 51/A of the Fundamental Law. 
49 The authorities sealed Röszke border crossing on 16 September 2015 leaving hundreds of 
asylum seekers stranded in the border zone. 11 migrants (‘the Röszke 11’) were arrested during 
clashes with the riot police and accused of illegal border crossing and participating in mass-riot, 
following a spontaneous protest against the blockade. 
50 See Section 4) of this report. 
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As the Venice Commission notes, neither the judges of the immigration proceedings, nor the 
Commissioner for Fundamental Rights (the Ombudsman) submitted complaints to challenge 
the constitutionality of the new measures introduced in the peak period of the refugee crisis 
that were at odds with international human rights obligations51 (Venice Commission, 2016). 
There were only two cases before the Constitutional Court. The Fundamental Law radically 
restricted the range of actors who could initiate a constitutional review. Due to the abolition 
of the institution of actio popularis, NGOs and advocacy groups are no longer entitled to 
submit ex post norm control requests (Arato et al, 2012:477). 
The first case was submitted by multiple petitioners requesting the Court to declare the 
referendum against the compulsory relocation of refugees unconstitutional. One of the 
petitioners’ main concerns was that referendums, as set out in the Constitution, may only be 
held about questions that fall within the scope of the Parliament’s power,52 while the subject 
of the upcoming referendum related to EU common policy. The Court in its decision rejected 
all petitions claiming lack of jurisdiction to examine whether the question of the referendum 
relates to a matter within the authority of the Parliament.53   
 
The second was filed by the Ombudsman after the failed amendment proposal to the 
Fundamental Law, in which he asked for an abstract interpretation in relation to the Council 
decision on the relocation quotas. The Commissioner did not explicitly ask the Court to 
review the lawfulness of the Decision, but of actions within the EU legal framework that 
“facilitate the relocation of a large group of foreigners legally staying in one of the Member 
States without their expressed or implied consent and without personalised and objective 
criteria applied during their selection” (Drinóczi , 2016). Although the Court in its decision54 
declared the question out of its jurisdiction, it “rubber stamped the constitutional identity 
defence of the Orbán-government” by ruling that the Constitutional Court has the power to 
override EU law if it violates Hungary’s sovereignty or constitutional identity rooted in its 
“historical constitution” (Halmai, 2017). The Government, to date, has failed to comply with 
the Council Decision which eventually resulted in an infringement procedure against 
Hungary in May 2017.55   
 
As the Venice Commission observed, the way the Constitutional Court protects rights is 
‘Janus-faced’ since both the petition of the Ombudsman and the referendum are in conflict 
with, if not specifically aimed to undermine, the efforts made by the EU to protect the rights 
of asylum seekers (Venice Commission, 2016).      
                                               
 
51 See Section 4) of this report. 
52 Art 8(2) of Fundamental Law. 
53 12/2016. (VI. 22.) AB. 
54 22/2016. (XII. 6.) AB. 
55 Later in the year, the Court of Justice of the European Union turn down Hungary’s action 
against the relocation scheme - See Court of Justice of the European Union, ‘The Court dismisses the 
actions brought by Slovakia and Hungary against the provisional mechanism for the mandatory 
relocation of asylum seekers’, Press Release No 91/17, 6 September 2017, Available at: 
https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2017-09/cp170091en.pdf. On the 
infringement procedure see European Commission, ‘Relocation: Commission launches infringement 
procedures against the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland’, IP/17/1607, 14 June 2017, Available 
at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1607_en.htm; 
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4. The relevant legislative and institutional framework in 
the field of migration and asylum56 
Legislative framework 
The national legislation alignment with EU law started in early 2000s (Gödri, 2015). 
During the pre-accession process the main domestic rules on migration were harmonised 
with EU legal norms. Hungary entered the EU in 2004, and developed a four-tier immigration 
system in line with all the relevant EU instruments by the adoption of the Schengen acquis in 
2007 (Gödri, 2015; Melegh, 2016). Act I of 2007 on the Entry and Residence of Persons with 
the Right of Free Movement and Residence sanctions the situation of EEA citizens, Act II of 
2007 that of third-country nationals, and Act LXXX of 2007 sets the rules for asylum. Finally, 
Act LV of 1993 on Citizenship deals with the naturalisation of foreign citizens with ethnic ties 
to Hungary, stateless persons and recognised refugees.57 The rules of implementation of 
these Acts are laid down in the corresponding government decrees. After 2010, the policy 
concerning asylum seekers and beneficiaries of international protection has switched from 
permissive to rather restrictive mode, and Hungary mainly adopted the stricter rules of the 
Common European Asylum System (Ceccorulli et al, 2017); the detention of asylum 
seekers, for example, was introduced in 2013.58  
The Hungarian framework on immigration and asylum is a centralised system at the 
national level concerning both legislative and institutional design, local authorities play no 
role in the process (Ceccorulli et al, 2017). 
Institutional framework 
In Hungary it is the Minister of Interior who is responsible for policy making in the field of 
immigration and asylum, as well as for related EU matters. He works in cooperation with 
other ministries in charge of relevant issues, such as the Minister for National Economy 
(work permit issuance), Minister of Human Resources (education of migrant children) and 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs (co-elaboration of migration policy).59 Under the oversight of 
Ministry of Interior, Act XXXIX of 2001 established the Office of Immigration and Nationality 
(OIN), now Immigration and Asylum Office (IAO), as the only competent authority dealing 
with administrative duties related to visa, residence permits, asylum, and citizenship.60 The 
IAO is also in charge of running open reception facilities and closed detention centres for 
asylum seekers, and it works in close partnership with the Police, military and civil security 
                                               
 
56 The country reports published by ECRE (2017, 2018), that were written by the Hungarian 
Helsinki Committee, provide extensive and detailed information on the legislative and institutional 
framework.  
57 The already mentioned simplified naturalisation process was introduced to the 1993 Act by an 
amendment of Act XLIV of 2010.  
58 Detention of asylum seekers as a preventive measure had been in use prior to 2013, the 
ECtHR was, however, not satisfied with the lawfulness of these practices – see Lokpo and Touré v. 
Hungary; Abdelhakim v. Hungary; Said v. Hungary; Nabil and Others v. Hungary.  
59 European Commission Migration and Home Affairs, Annual Report 2016 on Migration and 
Asylum Policy (Part 2) in Hungary, Available at: Framework https://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/13a_hungary_apr_part2_en.pdf.  
60 As of 01 January 2017, citizenship matters have been transferred to the Prime Minister’s Office 
and the Government Office of the Capital.  
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services in migration management. The Police have responsibility for border control, 
removal-, return procedures and monitoring detention in shelters.61 According to its website, 
the IAO maintains “an outstanding relationship with the Regional Representation of the 
UNHCR”.62 Up until October 2017, the IAO had cooperation agreements with NGOs allowing 
oversight of the sites run by IAO, which was later terminated.63 
Policy 
The UNHCR in its feedback on the Government Migration Strategy for 2014-2020 expressed 
concerns about multiple aspects of the draft and called on the Government to adhere to a 
proactive rather than defensive communication and policy plan (UNHCR, 2013). The 
comments of the UNHCR, inter alia, reflect on the complete lack of ‘Best Interest 
Determination Procedure’, victim protection of trafficked persons, an institutionalised system 
of resettlement and a separate ‘Integration Strategy’, and an ‘Exit Strategy’ concerning 
protected individuals whose entitlement to stay in the reception facilities expires. The 
UNHCR furthermore underlined the shortcomings of detention monitoring, and criticised the 
‘weak’ relationship with NGOs, as well as the lack of explicit reference in the draft for 
minimum standards of treatment. The Government, however, did not only disregard the 
UNHCR recommendations, but from 2015 onward, in shifting away from the already positive 
features of the migration policy, launched a crackdown on immigration.  
This began in February 2015, with an anti-immigrant billboard campaign with messages, 
such as “If you come to Hungary, you have to respect our culture” or “If you come to 
Hungary, you can’t take the jobs of the Hungarian”. It was followed by the National 
Consultation on Immigration and Terrorism, a questionnaire sent to every household, in 
which asylum seekers were portrayed as “economic migrants”, a threat to the welfare 
system, and included statements suggesting a link between migration and terrorism. The 
objective of national consultation as policy tool is to gain legitimacy of policy 
implementations, demonstrating that decisions are made to reflect the majoritarian will. 64  
The campaign was followed by a plethora of law amendments that systematically 
transformed the framework, which has now arguably become, concerning asylum seekers, a 
caricature of the 1951 Geneva Convention. The overall restrictive nature of the new 
developments and the clear negligence of best international practice triggered fierce 
objection by NGOs, such as the Amnesty International, and the Council of Europe at the 
very early stages (HHC, 2015a; Amnesty International, 2015; ECRE, 2015; Council of 
Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, 2015). The measures, however, showed 
increasing derogation from EU law. The most controversial law amendments relevant to 
migration and asylum are listed below in chronological order.   
                                               
 
61 For further information on institutional framework, organisational structure, see Annex II.  
62 See IAO’s website – Available at: 
http://www.bmbah.hu/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&layout=item&id=391&Itemid=666&lang=
en, Accessed on: 21 February 2018.  
63 See HHC, Authorities Terminated Cooperation Agreements with the HHC, Available at: 
https://www.helsinki.hu/en/authorities-terminated-cooperation-agreements-with-the-hhc/.  
64For national consultations, referendum questions and billboards see Annex IV.    




Act CVI of 2015 gave authorisation to the Government to issue a decree establishing a list of 
safe third countries including all countries along the Western Balkans route.65 
The safe third country concept was introduced into Hungarian law by an amendment to the 
Asylum Act in November 2010.66 The country in respect to which Hungary applied the safe 
third country concept was mainly Serbia (UNHCR, 2016a), though the Hungarian Helsinki 
Committee (HHC) warned that Serbia cannot be regarded as safe third country, inter alia 
due to its poor recognition rate (HHC, 2011). In August 2012 the UNHCR reaffirmed this 
view by calling for the suspension of returns to Serbia (UNHCR, 2012a). The Administrative 
and Labour Law Panel of the Supreme Court (Kúria) also held that countries whose asylum 
system is ‘overburdened’ cannot be considered as safe third country.67 Hungary, however, 
continued to apply this practice, resulting in the UNHCR, to avoid chain-refoulement, in 
October 2012 to call on states to refrain from transferring asylum-seekers back to Hungary 
(UNHCR, 2012b). When Hungary stopped applying the safe third country concept, UNHCR 
reversed this position. Notwithstanding these warnings, 30 June 2015 the Hungarian 
Parliament amended the Asylum Act, which provided for the Government to issue a decree 
establishing the above list of safe third countries.68  
Act CXXVII of 2015 introduced the accelerated procedure, where submission deadlines are 
curtailed and suspensive effect of appeals is denied (Nagy, 2016a).69 The Act provides that 
the asylum application is inadmissible if the applicant stayed/travelled through the territory of 
a safe third country and would have had the opportunity to apply for effective protection, or 
has relatives in that country and may enter its territory.70 In the event of rejection on this 
basis, the applicant may - no later than within three days - make a declaration concerning 
why in her or his case that country in question cannot be considered as safe.71 Originally, the 
judicial review request against the rejection decision had to be submitted within 3 days in the 
first period,72 in which new facts or new circumstances could not be referred to.73 The 
submission of judicial review request, similarly to accelerated procedures, had no 
suspensive effect on the enforcement of the decision.74  
                                               
 
65 Government Decree no 191/2015 (VII. 21.) on Safe Countries of Origin and Safe Third 
Countries. Available at: http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/55ca02c74.pdf.  
66 For critical analysis see Gyollai D and Amatrudo A (2018) Controlling irregular migration: 
International human rights standards and the Hungarian legal framework, European Journal of 
Criminology, (forthcoming).   
67 2/2012 (XII. 10.) KMK Opinion, Available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/50ee7a732.html.  
68 Art 93(2) of Asylum Act, as amended by Act CVI of 2015.  
69 See ‘Accelerated procedure’ in this report. 
70 Art 51(4) of Asylum Act, as amended by Act CXXVII of 2015. 
71 Art 51(11) of Asylum Act, as amended by Act CXXVII of 2015. 
72 Former Art 53(3) of Asylum Act, later amended by Act CXL of 2015 – now 7 days. 
73 Former Art 53(2a) of Asylum Act, as amended by Act CXL of 2015, and abolished by Act 
CXLIII of 2017. 
74 Former Art 53(2) of Asylum Act, as amended by Act CXXVII of 2015, and amended by Act 
CXLIII of 2017 – Judicial review request submitted against rejection decision made on this ground, as 
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The Act provides for the establishment of border closure (fence) on the border.75 By mid-
September, a 175 km long barbed wire fence had accordingly been constructed on the 
border between Hungary and Serbia, which was later extended to the Croatian border 
section (ECRE, 2015). 
Act CXL of 2015 provides for the establishment of ‘transit zones’ at the borders, and 
refers to asylum-seekers being ‘temporarily accommodated’ in the zones for the purpose of 
immigration and refugee status determination process.76 The Act accordingly introduced  a 
simplified ‘border procedure’, which, in practice, represents a very limited access to the 
refugee status determination procedure.77  
The Act provides for the declaration of ‘crisis situation caused by mass immigration’, if, 
inter alia, any circumstance related to the migration situation directly endanger public 
security, public order or public health.78 The Government declared crisis situations in two 
Southern counties on 15 September 2015,79 which was expanded 9 March 2016 covering 
the whole territory of the country.80 The crisis situation has since been extended several 
times, and is currently in effect until 6 September 2018.81 During this newly introduced state 
of emergency, by the explicit order of the minister, the army may be deployed in the 
registration of asylum applications; the police has been assigned a quasi-unfettered power in 
the management of mass migration.82 
The following offences have been introduced to the Criminal Code, punishable by 3 to 
10 years’ imprisonment respectively: unauthorised crossing of the border closure,83 
damaging the border closure,84 and obstruction of the construction works related to the 
border closure.85 Individually, or in combination with other sentences, expulsion of the 
convicted would be mandatory.86  
A new chapter of the Act on Criminal Proceedings provides for the procedure to be 
followed in case of the new criminal offences listed above.87 The defendant can be brought 
                                                                                                                                                  
 
of 01 January 2018, has suspensive effect. As general rule, appeals against inadmissibility decision 
otherwise have still no suspensive effect, see Art 53(6).  
75 Art 5 of Act LXXXIX of 2007 on the State Border, as amended by Act CXXVII of 2015. 
76 Art 15/A of Act LXXXIX of 2007, as amended by Act CXL of 2015. 
77 See ‘Border procedure’ in this report. 
78 Art 80/A of Asylum Act, as amended by Act CXL of 2015. 
79 Government Decree 269/2015. (IX. 15.) announcing crisis situation caused by mass migration. 
Available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/55f90f614.html.  
80 Government Decree 41/2016. (III. 9.) Available at: 
https://net.jogtar.hu/jr/gen/hjegy_doc.cgi?docid=a1600041.kor.  
81 Government Decree 21/2018. (II. 16.) Available at: 
https://net.jogtar.hu/jr/gen/hjegy_doc.cgi?docid=A1800021.KOR&timeshift=fffffff4&txtreferer=0000000
1.TXT.  
82 Art 80/G of Asylum Act and Act CXLII of 2015 on the Amendments of Certain Acts Related to 
the More Efficient Protection of Hungary’s Border and the Management of Mass Migration. 
83 Art 352/A of Act C of 2012 on the Criminal Code, as amended by Act CXL of 2015. 
84 Art 352/B of Act C of 2012 on the Criminal Code, as amended by Act CXL of 2015. 
85 Art 352/C of Act C of 2012 on the Criminal Code, as amended by Act CXL of 2015. 
86 Art 60(2a) of Act C of 2012 on the Criminal Code, as amended by Act CXL of 2015. 
87 Chap XXVI/A of Act XIX of 1998 on Criminal Proceedings, as amended by Act CXL of 2015. 
HORIZON 2020 – RESPOND (770564) – HUNGARY 
26 
to trial within 15 days after his or her interrogation, or within 8 days if caught in flagrante.88 
During the ‘crisis situation caused by mass immigration’ these criminal proceedings are to be 
conducted prior to all other cases.89 There is no requirement to provide a written translation 
of the indictment and of the judgement to the defendant who does not speak the Hungarian 
language.90 Whilst the amendments also provide for mandatory participation of a defence 
lawyer, in practice, most lawyers appointed by the court only had met their clients 
immediately prior to the hearings, where the indictment was generally presented only orally, 
without having been served in writing beforehand (UNHCR, 2016a:21; HHC, 2015c).91 
2016 
Act XXXIX of 2016 reduced the maximum length of stay of people granted international 
protection in reception centres from 60 to 30 days of the date of the decision on 
recognition.92 In practice, this means they are required to leave the centre before being 
issued an ID card (ECRE, 2018:106). The entitlement of refugees and beneficiaries of 
subsidiary protection to basic healthcare was also reduced from 1 year to 6 months.93 The 
Act provides for the mandatory revision of the existence of criteria for recognition of 
beneficiaries of subsidiary protection and refugees at least every 3 years following 
recognition.94  
Act XCIV of 2016 provides for the police to ‘escort’ migrants illegally present in the 
territory to the other side of the border closure, insofar as they are apprehended within 8 km 
of the border.95 Asylum seekers who experienced such push backs and were later 
interviewed by Human Rights Watch, providing accounts of police violence and cruelty: 
violent pushbacks, beatings, the setting of dogs on asylum seekers (Human Rights Watch, 
2016). 
Before 2014, recognised refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection were 
transferred from the reception facilities to a “pre-integration reception centre” in Bicske. The 
initial length of stay was six months, which could be extended once for another six-month 
period. Persons with tolerated stay could stay the reception facility in Debrecen, or be placed 
in the community shelter in Balassagyarmat (ECRE, 2013:35). As of January 2014, the 
integration system shifted from camp-based to community-based integration. Integration 
support was provided to a person granted international protection for 2 years following 
recognition. The amount of integration support was set in an integration contract and the 
support was provided by the family care service of the local council. A social worker was 
appointed supporting them throughout the integration process (ECRE, 2018:106-107). In 
                                               
 
88 Art 542/N of Act XIX of 1998, as amended by Act CXL of 2015. 
89 Art 542/E of Act XIX of 1998, as amended by Act CXL of 2015. 
90 Art 542/K of Act XIX of 1998, as amended by Act CXL of 2015. 
91 For critical analysis see Gyollai D and Amatrudo A (2018) Controlling irregular migration: 
International human rights standards and the Hungarian legal framework, European Journal of 
Criminology, (forthcoming).   
92 Art 32(1) of Asylum Act, as amended by Act XXXIX of 2016 on the Amendment of Certain Acts 
Relating to Migration and Other Relevant Acts. 
93 Art 32(1a) of Asylum Act, as amended by Act XXXIX of 2016. 
94 Art 7/A and 14 of Asylum Act, as amended by Act XXXIX of 2016. 
95 Art 5(1a) of Act LXXXIX of 2007, as amended by Act XCIV of 2016. 
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2016, the Government significantly decreased the financial support provided to asylum 
seekers, including the monthly cash allowance and the school enrolment benefit for minor 
asylum seekers.96 Moreover, the new decree abolished all previous integration benefits, and 
the integration contract for asylum seekers who are granted international protection,97 
meaning that upon exit of the reception facilities they cannot rely on any institutionalised 
support other than that of NGOs.  
2017 
Act XX of 2017 provides for the extension of the ‘8-km Rule’ to the entire territory of Hungary 
during ‘crisis situation caused by mass immigration’.98 The grounds for declaration of such 
state of crisis have been broadened,99 and so have the discretion of the authorities in this 
regard.100 During the state of crisis, asylum application can only be submitted in person in 
the transit zone.101 Third country nationals, who are otherwise accommodated in open 
reception facilities or detained in immigration or asylum detention centres, may be allocated 
and transferred to the transit zone,102 including unaccompanied minors between the age of 
14 and 18 years; if new applicants, even without guardian assigned.103 The HHC 
successfully requested interim measures by ECtHR to halt, among others, eight 
unaccompanied minor asylum seekers to the transit zone (HHC, 2017a). The Act eliminates 
the maximum time cap of 4 weeks and provides for indefinite placement (de facto 
detention)104 of third country nationals in the transit zone.105 Unless granted protection, the 
expenses of the stay are borne by the third-country national.106 The deadline for submitting 
judicial review request against inadmissibility decision and against rejection in accelerated 
procedure is shortened to 3 days.107 
The latest amendment package (Act CXLIII of 2017) amending 16 related Acts came into 
force 01 January 2018. The amending Act mainly contains technical changes that were 
necessary due to the coming into force of Act CL of 2016 on General Public Administration 
Procedures, leaving the above issues unresolved.   
                                               
 
96 Former Art 22 and 30 Government Decree 301/2007 (XI. 9.) on the implementation of Act 
LXXX of 2007 on Asylum, repelled by Art 8 of Government Decree 62/2016 (III. 31.) on the 
Amendments of Certain Government Decrees Relating to Migration and Asylum. 
97 Former Art 37 of Government Decree 301/2007 (XI. 9.), abolished by Art 8 of Government 
Decree 62/2016 (III. 31.). 
98 Art 5(1b) of Act LXXXIX of 2007, as amended by Act XX of 2017. 
99 Art 80/A(c) of Asylum Act, as amended by Act XX of 2017. 
100 Art 80/H-I of Asylum Act, as amended by Act XX of 2017. 
101 Art 80/J (1) of Asylum Act, as amended by Act XX of 2017. 
102 Art 62 (3a) and Art 110 (20) of Act II of 2007 on the Admission and Right of Residence of 
Third-Country Nationals; Art 92/C of Asylum Act, as amended by Act XX of 2017. 
103 Art 80/H and Art 92/C of Asylum Act, Art 62 (3a) and Art 110 (20) of Act II of 2007, read in 
conjunction with Art 4 (1)(c) of Act XXXI of 1997 on the Protection of Children and the Administration 
of Guardianship, as amended by Act XX of 2017. 
104 See Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary, ECtHR, 14 March 2017, App no 47287/15. 
105 Art 15/A (2) and (2a) of Act LXXXIX of 2007, as amended by Act XX of 2017. 
106 Art 62 (4) of Act II of 2007, as amended by Act XX of 2017 – not applied in practice. 
107 Art 80/K of Asylum Act, as amended by Act XX of 2017.  
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The Government’s opposition to and non-compliance with EU law have not remained without 
consequence. In December 2015, and then in May 2017 the European Commission opened 
infringement procedure against Hungary claiming the new rules were in breach of the recast 
Asylum Procedures Directive (2013/32/EU), the Return Directive (2008/115/EC), the 
Reception Conditions Directive (2013/33/EU), the Directive on the right to interpretation and 
translation in criminal proceedings (2010/64/EU), and ‘several provisions of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the EU.108   
“Stop Brussels” and “Stop Soros” – NGOs under attack 
One month prior to the infringement procedure in May, the Government, launched another 
national consultation entitled “Stop Brussels” focusing on various topics. The questionnaire 
included statements such as, “Brussels wants to force Hungary to let in illegal immigrants”, 
“Illegal immigrants heading to Hungary are encouraged to illegal acts by not just human 
traffickers but also by some international organizations” or “More and more organizations 
supported from abroad operate in Hungary with the aim to interfere with Hungarian internal 
affairs in a non-transparent manner”.109    
Instead of supporting, at the very least, making use of the expertise, enthusiasm and 
sources provided by the NGOs in Hungary during the migration crisis, the Government, in 
fact, launched an offensive against civil organizations as the “enemies of the state” (Nagy, 
2016a; Timmer, 2017). The explanation given by the Government is as follows: the migration 
crisis is attributable to and stoked by the Hungarian-American investor and philanthropist 
George Soros, whose plan is to “settle one million migrants in Europe”. NGOs providing 
humanitarian aid to asylum seekers only serve the execution of this so-called “Soros Plan” 
acting on behalf of Mr Soros as his agents. The “Stop Brussels” campaign was followed by, 
yet again, another consultation; this time entitled “About the Soros-Plan: Let us not leave it 
without comment!”. The summary of the questionnaire in brief: Soros along with EU leaders 
want to dismantle the fence and open borders for immigrants Africa and Middle-East. In 
order “to enhance the integration of illegal immigrants”, he is aiming “to push the native 
population’s language and culture into the background”. It singled out the Hungarian Helsinki 
Committee and the Amnesty International as Soros-founded organizations defending illegal 
immigrants.110 The Government has spent 7.2 billion forints (€23 million) in total on the anti-
EU and anti-Soros campaigns to support and spread its views.111 Moreover, in January 
2018, the Government outlined a law proposal including mandatory registration of all NGOs 
                                               
 
108 European Commission, ‘Commission opens infringement procedure against Hungary 
concerning its asylum law’, IP/15/6228, 10 December 2015, Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-15-6228_en.htm; European Commission, ‘Commission follows up on infringement 
procedure against Hungary concerning its asylum law, IP/17/1285, 17 May 2017, Available at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1285_en.htm.  
109 European Commission, Facts Matter: European Commission responds to Hungarian National 
Consultation, Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/commission-
answers-stop-brussels-consultation_en.pdf.  
110 The questionnaire in English available at: 
https://theorangefiles.hu/?s=stop+soros&submit=Search.  
111 EUobserver, ‘Orban stokes up his voters with anti-Soros consultation’, 22 November 2017, 
Available at: https://euobserver.com/beyond-brussels/139965.  
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that “support migration” and 25% tax imposition on foreign donation of such NGOs.112 The 
new bill would restrict movements of activists in preventing them from approaching the 
borders, activities of advocacy, recruitment of volunteers, production of information booklets. 
NGOs continuing such activities without the approval of the Interior Minister would face 
heavy fines, and potential total ban by withdrawal of their tax number. The draft proposal has 
now been submitted to the Parliament and will be debated after the election in April.113 
Although unprecedented in scope, the draft proposal did not come as a surprise. In October 
2017, the Prime Minister called on national security services to investigate NGOs of the 
“Soros Empire” that criticise his policies.114 Earlier, in June, the Parliament already passed a 
law on the mandatory registration and transparency of foreign-funded NGOs.115 Interfering 
with the right to freedom of association, the right to protection of private life and of personal 
data, the law met fierce criticism (Venice Commission, 2017), and eventually led to, yet 
again, another infringement procedure.116 In December 2017 the case was referred to the 
Court of Justice of European Union. 
                                               
 
112 See draft proposal, Available at: https://www.helsinki.hu/wp-content/uploads/Stop-Soros-
package-Bills-T19776-T19774-T19775.pdf.  
113 Reuters, ‘Hungary submits anti-immigration ‘Stop Soros’ bill to parliament’, 14 February 2018, 
Available at: https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-hungary-soros-law/hungary-submits-anti-immigration-
stop-soros-bill-to-parliament-idUKKCN1FY1O0.   
114 Financial Times, ‘Orban calls for Hungarian spy agencies to probe ‘Soros empire’ of NGOs’, 
27 October 2017, Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/e3888348-bb23-11e7-9bfb-4a9c83ffa852.  
115 Act LXXVI of 2017 on the Transparency of Organisations Receiving Foreign Funds, Available 
at: https://www.helsinki.hu/wp-content/uploads/LexNGO-adopted-text-unofficial-ENG-
14June2017.pdf.  
116 European Commission, Hungary: Commission launches infringement procedure for law on 
foreign-funded NGOs, Brussels, 13 July 2017, Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-
17-1982_en.htm.  
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5. The legal status of foreigners117  
Asylum applicants 
There is no time-limit or restrictions prescribed by law for submitting an asylum application. 
The application shall be submitted to the refugee authority in person.118 If the asylum 
application was submitted in immigration, criminal, or misdemeanour procedure, the 
proceeding authority shall refer the applicant to the refugee authority with no delay.119  
Concerning individuals, however, who were prosecuted for unauthorised crossing of the 
border fence120 and applied for asylum during the criminal trial, as witnessed by the UNHCR, 
applications for the stay of criminal proceedings referring to the non-penalisation principle of 
the 1951 Convention were dismissed on the grounds that eligibility for international 
protection was not a relevant issue to criminal liability. The judge argued, inter alia, that the 
defendant did not contact the authorities immediately after entering the territory; he 
presented an asylum application at the court three days after being apprehended. The 
applicants were referred to the IAO only after being convicted and sentenced to expulsion 
(UNHCR, 2016a:23). While the asylum application has a suspensive effect, and the law 
foresees the possibility to order a stay of enforcement of the expulsion if the individual in 
question is entitled to international protection,121 the stay order does not annul the sentence, 
never mind the conviction. 
Access to the territory 
Under the ‘8-km Rule’ that came into force in July 2016 and its expansion in March 2017,122 
the police automatically push back potential asylum seekers to the external side of the 
border fence. As a consequence of the measure, between 5 July 2016 and 31 August 2017, 
14,438 irregular migrants were pushed back from Hungarian territory, either towards Serbia 
or Croatia, without registration or allowing them to submit an asylum application (HHC, 
2017c).  
As of 28 March 2017, transit zones have been the only access to the territory for asylum 
seekers. There are two transit zones along the Serbian border located in Tompa and 
Röszke, and two along the Croatian section in Beremend and Letenye.123 The zones 
comprise of containers that serve as accommodation for asylum seekers as well as place for 
the refugee status determination process.124 The process starts with recording new arrival 
and clarifying the route taken by the applicant, who is then handed over to an immigration 
officer (Nagy, 2015). The identification process comprises document-, body- and luggage 
                                               
 
117 The country reports published by ECRE (2017, 2018), that were written by the Hungarian 
Helsinki Committee, provide extensive and detailed information on the legal status of asylum seekers 
and beneficiaries of international protection. 
118 Art 35(1)-(2) of Asylum Act. 
119 Art 64(2)-(3) of Government Decree 301/2007. (XI. 9.). 
120 See ‘2015-2017 Amendments’ in this report. 
121 Art 301(6) of Act CCXL of 2013 on the Execution of Criminal Punishments and Measures, 
read in conjunction with Art 51-52 of Act II of 2007. 
122 See ‘2015-2017 Amendments’ in this report. 
123 Transit zones at Baranya and Letenye have never been visited by asylum seekers. 
124 See ‘Border procedure’ in this report.  
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check, registration of personal data, provision of information on the procedure, taking 
photograph and sending fingerprints to AFIS (Automated Fingerprint Identification System) 
and the EURODAC (EASO, 2015).125  
Although the fence along with other deterrence measures have successfully diverted the 
Western Balkans route towards Croatia, the Hungarian-Serbian border section remained one 
of the major entry points to Western Europe (ECRE, 2017:16).  
Between 15 and 19 September 2015, thousands of asylum seekers arrived at Röszke, 
but only 352 people were allowed to enter the transit zone. Many of them left towards 
Croatia after waiting days on the other side of the fence without adequate care in a so-called 
‘pre-transit zone’ (UNHCR, 2016a:11). The processing capacity of each zone was said to be 
100 people per day, which was later reduced to 20-30, and as of 2 November 2015, only 10 
people were let in, and on working days only (ECRE, 2017:16). As of  23 January 2018, only 
1 person is let in at each zone (ECRE, 2018:11). The conditions in the pre-transit zones 
were reported as appalling. As described by HHC (2016) and the UNHCR (2016b) asylum 
seekers were waiting for entry in tents made of blankets distributed by UNHCR, while others 
sat amidst rubbish. Approximately one-third of the people waiting were children, many 
infants, some still breastfeeding. Families with small children and usually unaccompanied 
minors enjoyed priority over single men in terms of admission. Some single men had to wait 
for over 20 days without toilets and without being able to take a shower. While UNHCR 
distributed food packages every day, on at least one documented occasion the authorities 
prevented access to the volunteers of Oltalom and Migszol (Hungarian NGOs) to deliver 
food for those waiting in the pre-transit zone at Röszke.126  
In Autumn 2016, the Serbian authorities put an end to the practice of waiting in pre-
transit zones. Asylum seekers are now placed in temporary reception centres in Serbia. The 
admission to transit zones is coordinated by a “community-leader” chosen by the Serbian 
Commissariat for Refugees, who serves as a contact person for both the Hungarian and 
Serbian authorities, the only person staying in the pre-transit zone. The waiting lists are 
managed by the Commissariat. The criteria determining the order of entry is the time of 
arrival and the scale of vulnerability (ECRE, 2018:17-18). 
Border procedure  
Border procedure is to be followed in case the application has been submitted in the transit 
zone.127 During the procedure conducted at the border, the applicant is neither entitled to 
stay/obtain a permit authorising stay in the territory of Hungary, nor does she or he have the 
right to work in a reception centre or at a workplace128 as set out elsewhere in the Asylum 
                                               
 
125 See also IAO, Transit zones of Röszke and Tompa Expanded, April 2017, Available at: 
http://www.bmbah.hu/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=1055:transit-zones-of-roszke-and-
tompa-expanded&lang=en.  
126 Szlakovits, R. Határsértésnek számít az ételosztás Röszkénél? Megtiltották az ételosztást az 
Oltalom Karitatív Egyesületnek a röszkei tranzitzónánál, közben a száz fő befogadására alkalmas 
szabadkai táborban is már több mint ötszázan vannak. Delmagyar, 29 July 2016, Available at: 
http://www.delmagyar.hu/szeged_hirek/hatarsertesnek_szamit_az_etelosztas_roszkenel/2484185/. 
127 Art 71/A of Asylum Act, as amended by Act CXL of 2015. As of 28 March 2017, the regular 
procedure is conducted in transit zones – See Amendments 2017 in this report. 
128 Art 71/A (2) of Asylum Act, as amended by Act CXL of 2015. 
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Act and as determined by the general rules applicable to foreigners.129 Asylum seekers can 
be held in the transit zone for a period of maximum 4 weeks.130 The refugee authority shall 
deliver a decision on admissibility ‘with priority’ but no later than within 8 days.131 The 
deadline for submitting a judicial review request was extended from 3 days to 7 days.132 The 
rules of the review process are the same that apply in admissibility or accelerated 
procedure.133 In the review process, before January 2018, a court clerk, as well, had the 
authority to act, including the decision on the merits of the case.134 The personal hearing can 
be conducted via telecommunication network.135 
Although the border procedure cannot be applied to vulnerable individuals requiring 
special treatment,136 in practice, there is no assessment mechanism in place, only visible 
vulnerabilities are considered.137 Usually only families, unaccompanied minors, single 
women, elderly and disabled people are excluded from the border procedure after 
admittance to the transit zone, and transferred to open or closed reception facilities (ECRE, 
2018:42).138 These centres are run by IAO in cooperation with NGOs providing 
supplementary services for applicants. Medical services are available in each facility, though 
with insufficient access to interpretation (ECRE, 2018:70). 
Until spring 2017, the assessment of the asylum application focuses, in most cases, on 
the whether the applicant entered Hungary from a safe third country. The applicant’s 
personal circumstances and his or her need for international protection are not examined or 
taken into account. The IAO, in cases witnessed by the HHC, delivered an inadmissible 
decision in less than an hour, and ordered a ban on entry and stay for 1 or 2 years in the 
Schengen Information System (SIS). Regarding the opportunity to challenge that decision 
based on the safe third country concept, after providing brief information, IAO offered the 
applicants to sign a statement format, according to which the applicant disagrees. The IAO 
did not provide an opportunity to consult a legal adviser or to collect a supporting argument. 
The asylum-seekers interviewed by HHC did not understand the reasons for the 
inadmissibility and their right to judicial review (HHC, 2015b). NGOs, such as the HHC, have 
not always been able to monitor the procedure and provide legal advice due to lack of 
access to the zones. In 2015 only nine rejected asylum seekers submitted requests for 
judicial review, of which seven later withdrew their request. The hearings of the remaining 
two were conducted over Skype, and the judge after appeal still upheld the IAO’s decision, 
                                               
 
129 Art 5(1) a) and c) of Asylum Act. 
130 Art 71/A (4) of Asylum Act, as amended by Act CXL of 2015. 
131 Art 71/A (3) of Asylum Act, as amended by Act CXL of 2015. 
132 Art 53(3) of Asylum Act, as amended by Act CXL of 2015. 
133 See ‘Admissibility procedure’ in this report. 
134 Former Art 71/A (9) of Asylum Act, as amended by Act CXL of 2015 and abolished by Act 
CXLIII of 2017. 
135 Art 71/A (10) of Asylum Act. 
136 Art 71/A (7) of Asylum Act, as amended by Act CXL of 2015. 
137 Inadequate vulnerability assessment has always been an issue of concern - See O.M v. 
Hungary, ECtHR, App no 9912/15. 
138 All this changed in March 2017 – See Amendments 2017 in this report. 
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irrespective of the medical evidence proving that the applicants were suffering from post-
traumatic stress disorder (UNHCR, 2016a).139 
Airport procedure 
Although the Asylum Act provides for ‘airport procedure’ in case the asylum application is 
submitted at the airport, the procedure is rarely applied in practice. In the airport procedure 
the applicants shall be provided accommodation in the designated facilities in the transit 
area of the airport.140 If the application is not inadmissible, or a period of 8 days has elapsed 
after submitting the application, the applicant shall be permitted entry to the territory.141 
Asylum seekers admitted to the country are, however, routinely detained (ECRE, 2017:36); 
as of July 2013, applying for asylum in airport procedure constitutes grounds for asylum 
detention.142 There are approximately 100-200 applications submitted at the airport each 
year (ECRE, 2017:35). 
Regular procedure 
Following the submission of an application, the refugee authority shall determine whether the 
applicant falls under the Dublin Regulations, then examines whether the application is 
inadmissible, or if the conditions are met for an accelerated procedure. The inadmissibility 
decision, or the decision in accelerated procedure shall be made within 15 days, otherwise 
the IAO shall deliver its decision within 60 days.143 In practice, the deadlines are not always 
met; in cases that involve age assessment of unaccompanied minors, the procedure may 
take up to 2-5 months (ECRE, 2017:17). With respect to detained individuals seeking 
asylum144 and unaccompanied minors145, the procedure shall be conducted as a matter of 
priority. Unlike in case of detainees, regarding unaccompanied minors, this requirement is 
hardly fulfilled in practice (ECRE, 2017:20). 
The first instance decision is taken by the Refugee Directorate of the IAO.  
The possible outcomes are (ECRE, 2018:23):146 
a) Grant refugee status; 
b) Grant subsidiary protection status; 
c) Grant tolerated status; 
d) Rejection due to inadmissibility; 
e) Rejection on merits.  
                                               
 
139 For critical analysis see Gyollai D and Amatrudo A (2018) Controlling irregular migration: 
International human rights standards and the Hungarian legal framework, European Journal of 
Criminology, (forthcoming).   
140 Art 72(3) of Asylum Act. 
141 Art 72(5) of Asylum Act. 
142 Art 31/A (1) e) of asylum Act, as amended by Act XCIII of 2013. 
143 Art 47 of Asylum Act. 
144 Art 35/A of Asylum Act. 
145 Art 35(7) of Asylum Act. 
146 See ‘Beneficiaries of International Protection’ in this report. 
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Personal interview in the regular procedure 
Personal hearing of the asylum applicant is mandatory. It can be omitted only if the 
applicant: 
a) Is not fit for being heard; 
b) Submitted a subsequent application in which he or she failed to share facts or 
provide evidence that would indicate his or her recognition as a refugee or 
beneficiary of subsidiary protection. The personal interview cannot be omitted if the 
subsequent application is submitted by someone whose previous application was 
submitted on his or her behalf, referring to the applicant as a dependent person or an 
unmarried minor.147   
 
To determine the applicants’ fitness for interview, the IAO may consider a psychologist’s 
expert opinion. If necessary, the applicant may be given the opportunity to provide a written 
statement, or alternatively family members can be interviewed. If the applicant does not feel 
fit to be interviewed, the IAO may give permission for a family member or psychologist to be 
present at the hearing (ECRE, 2018:50-51).  
With the consent of the applicant, the IAO may require medical expert opinion to 
determine whether the applicant would comply with the criteria of a person with special 
needs.148 However, the procedure for requesting such document is not laid down in law. The 
Asylum Act further provides for the issuance of medical expert opinion in order to determine 
whether previous trauma, psychological condition accounts for contradictions and the 
incoherence of the applicant’s statement.149 In practice, however, medical expert opinions 
were mostly issued at the applicants’ request (ECRE, 2018:52). 
As the ECRE report notes, the only NGO that provides psycho-social rehabilitation for 
victims of torture is the Cordelia Foundation.150 Although Cordelia Foundation issues medical 
expert reports in line with the Istanbul Protocol, it does not qualify as forensic expertise in 
Hungarian law: thus both the IAO and the courts sometimes exclude or disregard its 
opinions. Moreover, the Cordelia Foundation has no access to transit zones, medical expert 
reports are therefore not used in border procedures (ECRE, 2018:52-53). 
The applicant may use his or her mother tongue or a language he or she understands. 
The refugee authority shall provide an interpreter, unless the refugee officer speaks a 
language understood by the applicant, and the asylum seeker gives his or her consent in 
writing to exclude the interpreter.151 Upon request, unless considered to be an obstacle, a 
same-sex interpreter and interviewer shall be provided.152 For asylum seekers who have 
faced gender-based persecution, this designation is compulsory, the provision gives no 
discretion whatsoever to the authority in this regard.153 
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Asylum seekers have their first interview usually within a few days after arrival. 
According to HHC, based on their observations in Békéscsaba asylum detention centre, 
asylum seekers often undergo an excessive number of repeated interviews (4-6). To HHC’s 
knowledge, there are no gender- or vulnerability-specific guidelines available for officers to 
conduct interviews. There is no code of conduct for interpreters in the context of asylum 
procedures, many of the interpreters have received no training on dealing with asylum 
cases. There is no quality assessment, nor are there professional standard requirements to 
become an interpreter for the IAO. The interpretation is often full of flaws and anomalies both 
in refugee camps and at the court (ECRE, 2017:20-22). In May 2017, the prosecutors sought 
a suspended prison sentence for an interpreter who was found deliberately tampering and 
falsifying the testimony of an asylum-seeking defendant put on trial in 2016 for his alleged 
role in the Battle of Röszke.154 
Appeals in regular procedure 
The decision must be communicated to the applicant orally in his or her mother tongue or in 
a language he or she understands, as well as in writing in Hungarian.155  
According to HHC’s observation in Kiskunhalas refugee camp, most decisions are not 
translated to asylum seekers by an interpreter, only by case officers, or even by fellow 
applicants. Only the main points of the decision are communicated, the decision is hardly 
ever explained (ECRE, 2017:22). There is no hard copy of the decision available for asylum 
applicants (ECRE, 2018:40). 
Decisions rejecting the application may be subject to judicial review. The review request 
shall be submitted to the IAO within 8 days of the communication of the decision, and the 
court shall decide within 60 days of receipt of the claim.156 The judicial review request has 
suspensive effect. The procedure is a single instance judicial review; the law provides for no 
onward appeal.157  
The personal hearing of the applicant is mandatory if she or he is a detainee, unless: 
a) The applicant cannot be summoned from his or her accommodation; 
b) The applicant has departed to an unknown destination; 
c) The appeal concerns a subsequent application presenting no new facts or 
circumstances.158 
Dublin Procedure 
The Dublin Procedure is applied whenever the criteria of the Dublin Regulation are met.159 
Once it is initiated, the asylum procedure is suspended until a decision is made determining 
the state responsible. This decision suspending the procedure is not challengeable.160  
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There is no available official information on how the criteria are applied. If an asylum 
seeker informs the refugee authority about a family member in another Member State, the 
IAO would request for original documents as proof of family ties. Costs of DNA testing shall 
be payable by the applicant (ECRE, 2017:25). 
Asylum seekers are systematically fingerprinted by the police. In 2015/2016, the IAO did 
not have the capacity to store all fingerprint data under the ‘asylum seeker’ category 
(category 1) in EURODAC. In some occasions, the fingerprints have been registered in 
category 2 and 3 of ‘irregular migrants’. Some people were forced to give fingerprints 
(ECRE, 2017:26). Refusal constitutes a ground for accelerated procedure,161 or the IAO may 
proceed with a decision on the merits of the application without conducting a personal 
interview.162 Dublin procedure can no longer be initiated after the IAO has made a decision 
on the merits of the asylum application (ECRE, 2017:26). 
As of February 2017, the HHC was not aware of cases where the IAO sought personal 
guarantees from the receiving Member State prior to the transfer (ECRE, 2017:26). If a 
Member State accepts responsibility, the IAO issues a decision on the transfer within 8 
days.163 Once this resolution is issued, the asylum seeker can no longer withdraw his or her 
application.164 
The asylum seeker has the right to appeal against the Dublin decision within 3 days.165 
The IAO shall forward the request to the court with no delay.166 The judicial review request 
has no automatic suspensive effect, nor has the application for such suspension of the 
implementation of the transfer.167 The court shall deliver its decision within 8 days. There is 
no personal hearing in the procedure, and the decision is not appealable.168 
The applicant is not always informed of the 3-day deadline for the review request. In 
case of submission of review request, the HHC observed cases when the Dublin Unit of the 
IAO forwarded the appeals to the court with several months delay. This practice has, since 
the end of 2016, been changed, when the HHC and the UNHCR raised the issue with IAO, 
and the head of the Dublin Unit was replaced. Although the Asylum Act does not provide for 
suspensive effect of appeals, in practice it leads to having a suspensive effect. While the 
court, as opposed to the 8-day deadline, delivers its decision within months (ECRE, 
2017:28).  
Where the applicant is not detained, it may be prohibited for him or her to leave the 
designated place of residence for a maximum of 72 hours in order to ensure the transfer is 
carried out.169 The transfer is organized by the Dublin Unit of the IAO in cooperation with the 
receiving Member State. The transfer is carried out by the police who assist with boarding 
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and escort the foreigner unless the circumstances do not require; voluntary transfers are 
rare (ECRE, 2017:27). 
Admissibility procedure 
The admissibility of the application shall be decided within 15 days. In practice, due to the 
large number of asylum seekers in 2015 and 2016, the procedure took a few weeks longer 
(ECRE, 2017:32). 
The application is inadmissible if: 
a) The applicant is EU citizen; 
b) The applicant was granted international protection by another EU Member State; 
c) The applicant was recognised as refugee by a third country, and the protection exists at 
the time of the assessment, and the third country in question is ready to readmit the 
applicant; 
d) The application is repeated and no new circumstance or fact occurred that would 
suggest that the applicant’s recognition as refugee or beneficiary of subsidiary protection 
(BSP) is justified; 
e) There exists a country that qualifies as a safe third country for the applicant.170 
 
The application may be declared inadmissible under e) if: 
a) The applicant stayed in or travelled through the territory of a safe third country, and 
she or he would have had the opportunity to apply for effective protection; 
b) Has relatives in that country and may enter the territory; 
c) The safe third country requests the extradition of the person seeking recognition.171 
 
If the application was found inadmissible due to the safe third country concept, the 
applicant may declare immediately, but within 3 days, why in his or her case the country in 
question does not qualify as safe.172 Request for judicial review shall be submitted within 7 
days,173 the court shall deliver its decision within 8 days,174 which is not appealable.175 The 
judicial review request has no suspensive effect, unless it challenges a decision based on 
the safe third country concept.176 If the safe third country refuses to readmit the applicant, 
the refugee authority shall withdraw its decision and continue the procedure.177 
Before its abolishment as of January 2018, Art 53(2a) of the Asylum Act provided that no 
new facts or circumstances could be referred to in the judicial review request.  
Although Serbia, since 15 September 2015, has not readmitted third-country nationals 
under the readmission agreement, except for those who hold valid travel documents issued 
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by former Yugoslav states, the IAO kept issuing inadmissibility decisions based on safe third 
country grounds. The IAO did not automatically withdraw the inadmissibility decision, and 
individuals had to apply for asylum again. The ECRE report notes that asylum seekers had 
to go through the admissibility assessment two or three times. In some cases, their case has 
been declared admissible only after the fourth repeated application. Many failed to 
understand the reasons for rejection, as the vast majority had no access to legal assistance. 
Asylum seekers were sometimes being held in detention pending removal to Serbia after the 
final rejection decision. The IAO argued that Serbia could at any time change its position and 
start respecting the readmission agreement. In 2017, the IAO stopped issuing inadmissibility 
decisions based on safe third country grounds.178 
Accelerated procedure 
The accelerated procedure was introduced in 2015. The decision on the asylum application 
shall be made within 15 days.179 The application may be decided in an accelerated 
procedure if the applicant: 
a) Only discloses irrelevant information supporting his or her recognition as refugee or 
BSP; 
b) Originates from a country listed as a safe third country by national law or by the EU; 
c) Misled the authorities concerning his or her identity or nationality: 
• by providing false information; 
• by submitting false documents; 
• by withholding information or documents that may have had a 
negative influence on the decision making process; 
d) Presumably with bad-faith intent, has destroyed or dropped his or her ID card or 
travel document that would have been helpful in establishing his or her identity or 
nationality; 
e) Makes incoherent, contradictory, false or unlikely statements contradicting the 
substantiated information related to the country of origin, which makes clear that on 
the basis of his or her application, he or she is not entitled to recognition as refugee 
or BSP; 
f) Submitted a subsequent application with a new circumstance or fact that suggests 
that the applicant’s recognition as refugee or BSP is justified; 
g) Submitted an application with the only purpose of delaying or obstructing the 
expulsion order, or the implementation of the expulsion order issued by the refugee 
authority, the immigration police or the court; 
h) Unlawfully entered or extended his or her stay in the territory by failing to submit an 
application for recognition within a reasonable time frame, although he or she would 
have had an opportunity to submit such application, and has no reasonable excuse 
for the delay; 
i) Refuses to comply with his or her obligation to give fingerprints; 
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j) He or she represents a serious threat to national security or public order, or an 
expulsion order has been issued by the immigration authority for violating or 
‘endangering’ public order.180  
 
To determine whether the applicant represents a serious threat to national security or 
public order, the IAO shall request the national intelligence agency of Hungary 
(Alkotmányvédelmi Hivatal) or the Counter Terrorism Centre (Terrorelhárítási Központ – 
TEK) to provide an expert opinion.181 The ECRE report notes, however, as set out in Art 
71/A(8) of the Asylum Act, these authorities are not involved in asylum status determination 
in border procedures (ECRE, 2018:117).  
The application cannot be rejected solely on the ground of subsection h).182 The IAO, 
with the exception of subsection b), shall assess the merits of the application for recognition 
as refugee or BSP.183 When applying subsection b), the applicant may declare immediately, 
but within 3 days, why in his or her case the country in question does not qualify as safe.184 
The rules governing the judicial review request in accelerated procedure are the same as 
that apply in case of inadmissible decisions.  
In practice, before March 2017, the IAO initiated the execution of the expulsion order 
before the 7-day deadline for submitting a judicial review request, and asylum seekers were 
automatically transferred to immigration detention (ECRE, 2017:40-42). 
Beneficiaries of international protection 
The Hungarian legal framework distinguishes four categories of beneficiaries of international 
protection: refugee (‘menekült’), beneficiary of subsidiary protection (‘oltalmazott’), 
beneficiary of temporary protection (‘menedékes’), and person with tolerated stay 
(‘befogadott’)185. The refugee/subsidiary protection status is to be reviewed every 3 years.186 
Refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection have the right to free movement in the 
country, although shelters provided by NGOs are all located in Budapest. Concerning their 
education, adults have access to courses offered by NGOs and other independent bodies, 
such as the Central European University (ECRE, 2018:108). Refugees and beneficiaries of 
subsidiary protection have access to the labour market and healthcare under the same 
conditions as Hungarian citizens. There is, however, no data available on their employment. 
Due to the lack of institutionalised state support in place to enhance their employment 
prospects, they face serious difficulties and obstacles, as well as a significant language 
barrier. There are several forms of social welfare benefits available, such as public health 
care, unemployment benefit and other entitlements and social assistance, many of which, 
social housing for example, however, are conditioned to certain number of years of 
established domicile. Thus, protected persons, in practice, have very limited access to these 
benefits upon exit of reception facilities (ECRE, 2018:99-109). 
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Refugee  
A refugee is a foreign individual experiencing persecution, or holds a well-founded fear of 
persecution, in his or her country of origin or in the country of his or her usual residence, for 
reasons of race, nationality, membership of a particular social group, religious or political 
belief. The well-founded fear of persecution may also be based on events which occurred, or 
on activities that the foreigner has been engaged in, following departure from his or her 
country of origin.187 Hungary shall recognise a person as such if she or he verifies or implies 
that the criteria determined above, in compliance with the 1951 Geneva Convention, applies 
in his or her case,188 and she or he does not receive protection from his or her country of 
origin or from any other country.189 The minister responsible for immigration and asylum 
policy may otherwise grant refugee status to a foreigner in an ad hoc manner, if such 
recognition is warranted due to humanitarian reasons.190 The minister also may grant 
refugee status to a foreigner who was recognised as such by the UNHCR or another state, 
provided that the refugee authority established the applicability of the 1951 Convention in 
case of the foreigner in question.191  Besides the reasons set out in the 1951 Convention,192 
a foreigner shall not be recognised as a refugee if he or she represents a risk to national 
security,193 or is convicted for a crime punishable by at least 5 years’ imprisonment (in 
Hungarian law).194 If the country of origin of the applicant is on the national list of safe third 
countries or that of the EU, the burden of proof is on the applicant to prove that the country 
in question is not safe for him or her.195 For the purpose of family reunification, upon request, 
family members of a foreigner recognised as refugee shall as well be recognised as 
refugee.196 Children of recognised refugees born in Hungary, upon request, shall also be 
recognised as refugee.197 
The status shall cease if the refugee acquires Hungarian citizenship or it is withdrawn by 
the authority.198 The recognition can be withdrawn if: 
a) the refugee re-availed himself or herself of the protection of the country of origin; 
b) the refugee has voluntarily re-acquired his or her nationality; 
c) the refugee has acquired new citizenship and enjoys the protection of the new 
country of citizenship; 
d) the refugee has voluntarily resettled in the country he or she fled from; 
e) the reason of recognition has ceased to exist; 
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f) the refugee waives the legal status of refugee in writing; 
g) the refugee was recognised in spite of a reason for exclusion or such a reason 
occurred; 
h) the refugee has been granted status even though the criteria for recognition were not 
met; 
i) Having influenced the decision on its merits, the refugee failed to disclose relevant 
information, made a false statement or used false/forged documents in the 
application process.  
As a general rule, with exceptions provided by certain acts and government decrees, 
refugees enjoy the same rights and have the same obligations as Hungarian citizens.199 
Refugees have no right to vote, except in local elections, and may not hold an office tied by 
law to Hungarian citizenship (civil servant positions).200 The refugee is entitled to an identity 
card and a bilingual travel document, unless public order and national security 
considerations require otherwise.201 
Beneficiary of subsidiary protection 
Beneficiaries of subsidiary protection (BSPs) are foreigners who do not satisfy the criteria for 
recognition as refugee, but they face a real risk of being exposed to serious harm upon 
return to their country of origin, and are unable or, due to fear of such risk, unwilling to 
benefit from the protection of their country of origin.202 The fear of serious harm or of the risk 
of such harm is also considered to be well-founded if it relates to events that occurred, or to 
activities that the BSP has been engaged in, following departure from his or her country of 
origin.203 Hungary shall recognise a person as BSP if she or he verifies or implies that the 
criteria determined above applies in his or her case.204  
Children of BSPs born in Hungary, upon request, shall be recognised as BSP.205 Family 
members of BSPs shall as well be recognised as BSPs if the application for recognition has 
been jointly submitted, or the application of the family member is submitted with the consent 
of the BSP prior to the decision on his or her own application.206 No subsidiary protection 
shall be granted to a foreigner if there are reasonable grounds to believe that he or she has 
committed a war crime, crimes against humanity as defined in international law, a crime 
punishable by at least 5 years’ imprisonment in Hungarian law, or a crime contrary to the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations. Nor shall a person be granted subsidiary 
protection whose presence in Hungary is not conducive to national security.207 Concerning 
safe third countries, the same rules apply to BSPs as to refugees. Moreover, if the applicant 
travelled through or stayed in a safe third country prior to his or her arrival to Hungary, it is 
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the applicant who shall prove that she or he had no opportunity for effective protection in that 
country.208 The rules of cessation and withdrawal are the same that apply to refugees.209    
Unless act or government decree provides otherwise, BSPs have the same rights and 
obligations as refugees.210 They receive a special travel document, not a refugee 
passport.211 
Beneficiary of temporary protection212 
A foreigner shall be granted temporary protection for one year if she or he belongs to a 
group of displaced persons arriving in Hungary en masse who are recognised by: 
a) the Council of the European Union as eligible for temporary protection under the 
procedure determined by Council Directive 2001/55/EC on minimum standards for 
giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on 
measures promoting a balance efforts between Member States in receiving such 
persons and bearing the consequences thereof.213  
 
b) the Government as eligible for temporary protection as they have been forced to 
leave their country due to armed conflict, civil war or ethnic conflict, or systematic, 
widespread or severe violation of human rights, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment in particular.214 
 
Regarding eligibility criteria, similarly to refugee and BSP status, the burden of proof is 
on the applicant.215 Family members of beneficiaries of temporary protection who are under 
the temporary protection of another Member State of the EU shall also be recognised as 
beneficiaries of temporary protection.216 Concerning the rules of exclusion, besides those 
applicable to BSPs, no temporary protection shall be granted to a foreigner, if she or he 
committed a serious, non-political criminal offence outside the territory of Hungary.217 They 
are entitled to a document verifying their identity, a travel document authorising a single exit 
and return, and employment according to general rules applicable to foreigners.218 The 
duration of protection granted by the Government is set out in the normative decision of the 
Government, which can be extended.219  
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The status shall cease if:220 
a) The term of temporary protection as determined by the Government expires; 
b) The Council of the EU withdraws recognition; 
c) The beneficiary of temporary protection is granted resident status; 
d) He or she is recognised as refugee or BSP; 
e) The authority withdraws the status if; 
f) He or she acquires Hungarian citizenship.221 
The recognition shall be withdrawn if:222 
a) The beneficiary of temporary protection, with his or her consent, is granted 
temporary protection status by another state applying Directive 2001/55/EC; 
b) He or she was recognised in spite of a reason for exclusion or such a reason 
occurred; 
c) He or she waives the legal status of refugee in writing; 
d) He or she has been granted status even though the criteria for recognition were not 
met. 
Person with tolerated stay  
Hungary shall grant protection of “tolerated stay” to a foreigner who does not comply with the 
requirements for recognition as refugee or BSP, however, in the event of his or her return to 
the country of origin, he or she would face a real risk of persecution for reasons of race, 
religion, ethnicity, membership of a particular social group, political opinion, or would be 
exposed to danger of being sentenced to death, being tortured or subjected to other 
inhuman treatment or punishment.223 The refugee authority shall recognise a foreigner as a 
person with tolerated stay regarding whom the prohibition of non-refoulement was found 
established during the immigration procedure, even if his or her asylum application was 
rejected.224 Persons with tolerated stay are entitled to the rights afforded to residence permit 
holders.225 
Since the status is granted on the basis of the non-refoulement obligation, as opposed to 
subsidiary protection and refugee status, the law provides no grounds for exclusion. 
The status shall cease if:226 
a) The beneficiary of tolerated status is granted resident status on different grounds; 
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b) The authority withdraws the status;   
c) She or he acquires Hungarian citizenship.227 
The rules for withdrawal are the same that apply for refugees.228 
Regular migrants 
Since Hungary is part of the Schengen Area, the entry conditions for third-country nationals 
for a stay in Hungary of a duration of no more than 90 days in a 180-day period are as per 
Regulation (EU) 2016/399 (Schengen Borders Code).229 No one shall stay in the country 
who is subject to expulsion or ban on entry or stay, or whose stay is not conducive to public 
order, public health or to national security.230 Third country nationals who intend to stay for 
over three months may apply for long-term visa and residence permit. Rules of eligibility and 
the procedure to be followed are set out in Act II of 2007 on the Admission and Right of 
Residence of Third-Country Nationals and the Government Decree 114/2007 (V. 24.) on the 
Implementation of the Act. The applying rules are fairly complex, a simplified English 
language guideline for each category is available on OIN’s website.231 The main purposes 
for applying for residence are: gainful activity, employment, studies, and family 
reunification.232 
The application may be submitted in the country of origin. Documents verifying evidence of 
the purpose of the stay, sufficient means of subsistence (including healthcare, 
accommodation and return travel), proof of address, and a valid travel document shall be 
enclosed. A third-country national holding a valid residence permit has the right to entry and 
residence in a Schengen Member State, not exceeding 90 days within any 180-day period. 
They are required to promptly report if the residence permit is lost, stolen or destroyed. In 
case of change of address they shall notify the regional directorate of jurisdiction within three 
days. Third-country nationals shall report the birth of a child. 
Residence permit for the purpose of study may be issued to a third country national who is 
accepted by a public education institution pursuing full-time or daytime course, or 
preparatory course prior to such education, and able to verify the linguistic knowledge 
required for the pursuit of studies. The validity of the residence permit shall correspond with 
the duration of studies, or be extended if it is more than two years. Third-country nationals 
holding a residence permit for the purpose of studies may engage in any full time 
occupational activity, and have the right to the pursuit of gainful activity or to engage in 
employment. No work permit is necessary during the time of studies, insofar as the total 
working hours do not exceed a maximum of 24 hours weekly during term-time, and 90 days 
or 66 working days per year out of term-time. 
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Regarding residence permit for the purpose of employment, the validity of the permit is 
determined by the authority. As to gainful activities, the period is maximum three years, 
which may be extended by another three years. As mentioned before, as of June 2017, 
Serbian and Ukrainian citizens do not need work permit for employment in certain job 
categories, such as catering, nursing, IT,233 and no visa is required for them for a stay of up 
to 90 days.234 
For the purpose of family reunification, family members are: 
• The spouse of a third-country national; 
• The minor child (including adopted and foster children) of a third-country national with 
his/her spouse; 
• The minor child of a third-country national who is a custodial parent and the child is 
dependent on him/her; 
• The minor child of the spouse of a third-country national, where the spouse is a 
custodial parent. 
The spouse of a person granted refugee status may be issue residence permit if their 
marriage was contracted before the entry of the person with refugee status. The validity 
period of the residence permit issued for family reunification cannot exceed that of the 
sponsor.235  
Besides the categories discussed in the previous section, residence permit is granted on 
humanitarian grounds to stateless persons, third-country nationals who cooperate with the 
Police in fighting crime, to those who have been exposed to particularly exploitative working 
conditions, and minors who were employed illegally without valid residence permit 
(Ceccorulli, 2017:126). 
‘Beneficiaries’ of residency bond 
The Hungarian Investment Immigration Programme was launched in 2013 and had 
undergone several changes before the Government Debt Management Agency put a hold 
on the sale in March 2017. The programme, justified by the state’s economic interests in 
reducing state debt, made available for third-country nationals long-term residency in 
Hungary through the purchase of a ‘state bond’ worth €250.000, which was raised to 
€300.000 in 2015. The transactions were made via intermediary – mainly offshore – 
companies, selected by the Economic Committee of the Parliament then chaired by Antal 
Rogán (Fidesz). The service charge was €40-60,000 per bond. Between 2013 and 2016, 
                                               
 
233 Hivatalos Értesítő, A Magyar Közlöny Melléklete, 15 June 2017, p2928, Available at: 
http://www.kozlonyok.hu/kozlonyok/Kozlonyok/12/PDF/2017/28.pdf.  
234 HVG, ‘Engedély sem kell a szerb és ukrán gazdasági bevándorlóknak Magyarországon,’ 13 
July 2017, Available at: 
http://hvg.hu/gazdasag/20170712_Engedely_sem_kell_a_szerb_es_ukran_gazdasagi_bevandorlokna
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235 IAO website, Residence Permit for the Purpose of Family Reunification, Available at: 
http://www.bmbah.hu/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=54:residence-permit-for-family-
reunification&Itemid=808&lang=en#eligibility. Accessed: 27 February 2018.   
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altogether 17,009 bonds were sold for a total amount of €1.158 billion.236 Although the 
Government denied any connection or influence, prior to the termination of the settlement 
bond programme, Jobbik (right wing) offered their votes for the planned amendment of the 
Fundamental Law237 in condition that the Government stop the sale. 
Nagy concludes that, 1) the programme did not entail any investment into the economy, as 
the immigrants actually bought “securities” from the intermediary companies, who in turn 
purchased five-year zero bonds issued on behalf of the State at a discount; 2) most of the 
investors did not move to Hungary, the system functioned as a “loosely controlled backdoor 
into the Schengen area”;238 3) the system was designed with minimal parliamentary scrutiny. 
The real beneficiaries of the Programme are the agent companies, whose income, through a 
complex web of further contributors, is not taxable in Hungary (Nagy, 2016b). 
Irregular migrants 
Immigration to Hungary is mainly transit migration. Irregular migrants using the Western 
Balkan path have been en route to Western European countries when passing through 
Hungarian territory. Approximately 90% of them stay only for a few days, maximum two 
weeks before absconding (WHO, 2016:4). The paths to irregularity are: irregular entry, 
overstay visa/residence permit, leaving the reception facility during immigration process 
(possibly moved on to other EU Member States), unlawful employment, typically seasonal or 
temporary (EMN, 2015; Futo, 2016). 
Although there is no official statistical data available, based on expert opinion and 
administrative data of the Police, the number of long-term resident irregular population in 
Hungary is low. The estimate number was between 10,000 and 50,000 in 2008 (EMN, 
2015:7-9; Biffl, 2012:50).  
Irregular migrants mainly arrived from the neighbouring countries, especially from 
Romania. With Romania’s accession to the EU in 2007, and even more so after the 
naturalisation programme, this ceased to be a problem (Szeman, 2012). In 2008, Chinese 
and Vietnamese visa over-stayers constituted the largest number or irregular migrants 
residing in the country.  
Hungary initiated only one amnesty programme. During EU accession in 2004, the 
authorities declared amnesty for those who clarified their personal data and fulfilled one of 
the following criteria: a) were married to a Hungarian citizen or to a non-Hungarian citizen 
legally resident in Hungary, b) had a Hungarian citizen child, c) were able to prove that they 
received income as the owner or manager of a company, d) were able to prove cultural link 
to Hungary, e) applied for asylum and were able to provide proof of entry prior to 1 May 
                                               
 
236 HVG, ‘Kiderült, mennyit kapott a letelepedési kötvényekért az állam’, 28 June 2017, Avalable 
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237 Failed Seventh Amendment - See Section 3 of this report.  
238 See 444.hu, ‘A suspected international criminal and the Syrian dictator’s money man also 
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2003. Altogether 1,406 people registered and reported themselves to the authorities, more 
than 60% of which Chinese and Vietnamese citizens.239 
In past years, the primary issue of irregular migration was the increasing number of 
irregular border crossings attributable to the refugee crisis. In 2014, there were 43,360 
irregular border crossings registered (EMN, 2015). According to the IAO’s statistical data, 
two thirds of the 161,000 asylum seekers registered in the first eight months of 2015 entered 
the country irregularly (Amnesty International, 2015:4). The overall number of irregular 
migrants who are not in contact with the authorities, however, cannot be defined. 
When apprehended, for most irregular migrants, entering the asylum process were the 
major form of regularising their stay. Since the entry into force of Act I of 2007 on the Entry 
and Residence of Persons with the Right to Free Movement and Residence, legalisation by 
marriage of an EEA citizen or by parenthood has become more frequent than legalisation by 
asylum application (Futo, 2008).  
Irregular migrants only have the right to emergency health care. The service includes, 
among other things, major trauma and wounds, maternity needs, serious infectious 
diseases, attempted suicide and acute psychological disorders (WHO, 2016:13). Maternity 
needs means basic care, in which pregnancy related complications are included, but further 
maternity care is conditioned to residence (Björngren-Cuadra, 2012:118). Any medical issue 
beyond that would have to be paid by the irregular migrant. A 2010 research found that 
irregular migrants’ biggest concern was the high cost of healthcare services, since it is very 
difficult to access medical services without insurance coverage. Whilst doctors occasionally 
provided service out of personal compassion, migrants were usually refused service 
provision by general practitioners. The only exception in this regard is HIV/AIDS and 
hepatitis treatment, which are free of charge. The most vulnerable group of irregular 
migrants were women, especially single women with children; many cases of sexual 
harassment were reported. There are no official transition services in place, only NGOs have 
the capacity to inform and help migrants with advice if they are approached with such 
requests. Irregular migrants have no access to social housing or homeless centres; often 
their only alternative is sleeping outdoors (PICUM, 2010). 
Undocumented migrants have restricted access to the education system in Hungary 
(PICUM, 2012). Concerning the irregular employment of migrants, there is no statistical data 
available.  It is notable that irregular employment, irrespective of immigration status, looks 
back on a long tradition in Hungary. Irregular employment of legally residing migrants and 
employment of irregular migrants is just a piece in the puzzle. Foreigners are most likely 
employed irregularly in sectors that are already affected by irregular employment, such as 
catering, agriculture, household, process manufacturing, and construction. Regarding labour 
rights, undocumented migrants are vulnerable to exploitation, if caught, they face the risk of 
expulsion (Menedék, 2014). Although irregular migrant workers have mainly arrived from 
neighbouring countries, the recently adopted favourable conditions concerning their 
employment will most likely change this pattern: according to a Communication issued by 
                                               
 
239 DEMIG (2015) DEMIG POLICY, version 1.3, Online Edition, Oxford: International Migration 
Institute, University of Oxford. Available at: https://www.imi.ox.ac.uk/data/demig-data/demig-policy-
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the Minister of National Economy, as of June 2017, Serbian and Ukrainian jobseekers do not 
need work permit for employment within 41 skill shortage categories.240 
Unaccompanied minors 
Under Hungarian law, an unaccompanied minor (UAM) is a foreigner, under-18 years of age, 
who entered the territory of Hungary without the company of an adult responsible for his/her 
supervision on the basis of law or custom, or remained without supervision following entry; 
as long as she or he is not transferred under the supervision of such a person.241 Since they 
lack parental care, the IAO is responsible for initiating the placement of UAMs under interim 
care,242 by contacting the guardianship authority for placement and requesting for the 
appointment of a guardian who represents the UAM’s interests.243 UAMs cannot be 
detained.244 They may be placed in child protection institution or in private accommodation at 
relatives, if the relative undertakes a commitment in writing to provide room, board and 
support for the minor, and if it is evident that such placement is in the minor's best interest.245 
In practice, UAMs are accommodated in the Children’s Home in Fót. Until April 2016, non-
asylum seeker unaccompanied minors were accommodated in the Children’s Home in 
Hódmezővásárhely. This practice has since been changed, the institution only receives 
Hungarian citizen children (Ivan, 2016:20). Unaccompanied minors seeking international 
protection (UASC) are all accommodated in a designated child protection institution in Fót.246 
The home can host 50 children. Between April and October 2017, the occupancy level was 
36-74%.247 In January 2017, the Government announced the shutdown of the Home by mid-
2018. Besides Hungarian citizen children with special needs, the institution currently 
provides accommodation for UASC awaiting a decision in their asylum case, and minors 
who have already been granted international protection. At the time of writing, however, it is 
not entirely clear where the unaccompanied minors will be allocated after the closure (HHC, 
2017b:17). UASC (and UAMs) fall within the category of a ‘person in need of special 
treatment’,248 and as such they cannot be subject to the border procedure in the transit 
zone.249 As of March 2017, UASC above 14 are held in transit zones in de facto detention. In 
2017, altogether 91 unaccompanied children were detained in transit zones (ECRE, 
2018:82). 
                                               
 
240 Hivatalos Értesítő, A Magyar Közlöny Melléklete, 15 June 2017, p2928, Available at: 
http://www.kozlonyok.hu/kozlonyok/Kozlonyok/12/PDF/2017/28.pdf. 
241 Art 2 e) of Act II of 2007 on the Admission and Right of Residence of Third-Country Nationals, 
and Art 2(f) of Asylum Act. 
242 Art 72 (1) of 1997 on the Protection of Children and the Administration of Guardianship. 
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UAMs, regardless of immigration status, cannot be returned to a country where family 
reunification or adequate care is not possible.250 Rejected UASC usually abscond and 
continue their journey in an irregular manner. Since September 2015, Serbian authorities 
have been reluctant to readmit third-country nationals. Prior to that practice, UAMs, including 
rejected UASC, were readmitted to Serbia as well (HHC, 2017b:7). UAMs shall be granted a 
residence permit on humanitarian grounds,251 and have access to Hungarian citizenship on 
preferential terms.252 The asylum procedure shall be conducted as a matter of priority in their 
case.253 The refugee authority shall, without delay, request the guardianship authority to 
appoint a child protection guardian, who serves to represent the minor. The guardian shall 
be appointed within 8 days of the arrival of the request. Both the unaccompanied minor and 
the OIN shall, without delay, be notified of the person of the guardian appointed.254  
Prior to an amendment to the Child Protection Act, before 2014, a ‘temporary guardian’ 
was appointed to UASC, who was responsible for their legal representation in the asylum 
procedure, the children’s overall care and property management. As of January 2014, a 
‘child protection guardian’ shall be appointed to both UASC and UAMs.255 The child 
protection guardian is employed by the Child Protection Services of Budapest (TEGYESZ). 
In 2015, due to the high number of new arrivals, there were significant delays in the 
process, and UAMs having transited through Hungary often never met their appointed child 
protection guardian. Since the legislator set an 8-day deadline,256 and the number of asylum 
seekers entering the country dropped, there has been a major improvement in the practice. 
Although the guardians provided by Child Protection Services are not affiliated to, but are 
based at the designated children protection institution in Fót, as they were before the 
amendment, they frequently visit the children, and actively cooperate with NGOs in 
performing their tasks (Ivan, 2016:10). 
The child protection guardian is responsible for the legal representation of the UAM in all 
proceedings, making sure that the child’s opinion is heard.257 In order to ensure the child’s 
physical, mental and emotional development, the guardian, inter alia: 
• Contacts and communicates with the child in a manner appropriate to the child’s age; 
• Shall be available for the child for consultation over the phone, and upon request, 
arrange personal meetings; 
• Supervises the education of the child by consulting with the educational institution; 
• Cooperates with the children protection institution in obtaining information about the 
family of the child; 
• Participates in drafting the child’s personal care plan; 
                                               
 
250 Art 45(5) of Act II of 2007, and Art 45(2) of Asylum Act.  
251 Art 29(d) of Act II of 2007. 
252 Art 4(4) Act of LV of 1993 on Hungarian Citizenship.  
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254 Art 35(6) of Asylum Act. 
255 Art 84 (1)(c) of Act XXXI of 1997. See Policies, practices and data on unaccompanied minors 
in 2014: Hungary, European Migration Network, 2014, p11-14, Supra note x. 
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257 Art 11(2) of Act XXXI of 1997. 
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• Cooperates with the children protection institution in order to prevent reoffending in 
case the child has been charged/convicted of a criminal offence; 
• Assists the child in choosing profession and career; 
• Shall, at least semi-annually, submit reports on the guardianship activity.258  
   
Except UASC during ‘crisis situation caused by mass immigration’,259 UAMs fall under 
the personal scope of the Child Protection Act.260 Thus, with a very few exceptions they 
enjoy the same rights, including access to kindergarten and school education, and 
healthcare as children with Hungarian citizenship. 
Under the age of 16, UAMs are entitled and obliged to attend public education.261 UASC 
granted international protection are enrolled in the mainstream child welfare system, the 
same rules apply as to all other children in Hungary. Upon request, until the UASC (also 
children with parents) turns 21, during his or her stay in the reception centre, the refugee 
authority shall reimburse the costs of education, inclusive the relevant travel expenses, the 
costs of meals at the educational institution, and of the accommodation at a student 
hostel.262 Once they turn 18, only UAMs granted international protection are eligible for after-
care arrangements (EMN, 2014:17). After-care service provides financial support, free 
education and housing, and some personal assistance until the age of 24.263  
Within Fót Children’s Home, the educators provide educational, lifestyle and economic 
monitoring. Several NGOs, such as SOS Children’s Village, Menedék, Open Doors provide 
non-formal education sessions, Hungarian language classes and community programs for 
minors (HHC, 2017b:19). 
Irrespective of immigration status, UAMs have unconditional access to emergency 
health care services, inclusive life-saving medical interventions and all treatment necessary 
to prevent any sever or irreversible health deterioration.264 Otherwise, only UAMs with 
refugee status and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection are entitled to the same health care 
services as Hungarian citizen children, as well as to health insurance during their enrolment 
to school (EMN, 2014:22). Fót Children’s Home provides paediatric services for the children, 
and there is a hospital with qualified child specialist staff in close proximity (HHC, 2017b:19). 
Representatives of international organizations and NGOs (HHC, Menedék, Cordelia 
Foundation, Terre des Homes, Kék Vonal, Refugee Mission of the Reformed Church and the 
UNHCR) organized a roundtable with the Ministry of Human Resources in 2013 on the 
situations of UAMs. After three meetings, it stopped functioning in 2014 (Ivan, 2016:18).  
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The registration of UAMs in transit zones shows inconsistency, and due to the 
contradictions found in IAO’s statistical data, is arguably dysfunctional (Ivan, 2016:9). 
Although the best interest of minors should be a primary consideration throughout the entire 
asylum procedure,265 the practice is far from satisfying the specific needs arising from their 
situation.  
Despite the efforts made by HHC, the Hungarian asylum system still lacks a formalized 
best interest determination procedure or protocol (Ivan, 2016:29). Although the Asylum Act 
provides that the detention shall be terminated without delay if it has been established that 
the detainee is UASC,266 the age assessment practices are not of multidisciplinary character, 
as opposed to the guidelines of, inter alia, EASO and UNHCR. The applied methods are 
merely based on medical examinations, completely disregarding the differences between 
various populations of the world regarding pubescence, psychological and emotional 
development of children, as well as their cultural background and the impact of different 
nutrition. In some cases, the IAO rejects the applicants’ request for age assessment, or 
claims that the costs of assessment, unaffordable to many, are payable by the asylum 
seeker. Children arriving in Hungary without valid documents face a real risk of being 
detained due to the inaccuracy of the age assessment (HHC, 2017b:10-12). 
The 2015 amendments to the Act on Criminal Procedure require that all coercive 
measures must be used with respect to the interest of minors.267 The special safeguards and 
rules applying to minors in general268 were, however, not applicable in the criminal 
procedures relating to the border closure.269 There was no requirement to appoint a guardian 
for minors, and legal guardians, if there were any, were not able to exercise their rights 
related to the criminal case. Neither the favourable rules relating to deferred prosecution, nor 
the specialised rules of evidence pertaining to juveniles (minors between 12 and 18) applied 
in these cases (HHC, 2015c). This complete exemption of the favourable rules applying to 
minors was abolished in 2017, the new amendments are nevertheless still restrictive 
compared to the general procedures.270 
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6. Conclusion 
On 14 March 2017, the ECtHR delivered its judgement in Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary, a case 
of two Bangladeshi asylum seekers who were held in Röszke transit zone for 23 days, and 
then sent back to Serbia based on Hungary’s safe third country rules.271 The Court held that 
the applicants’ expulsion from the transit zone to Serbia constituted a breach of Art 3 of 
ECHR, arguing that the procedure applied by the authorities was not appropriate to provide 
necessary protection against a real risk of inhuman and degrading treatment: the authorities 
relied on the Government’s list of safe third countries, disregarding reports by, inter alia, the 
UNHCR, and other evidence submitted by the applicants, and imposed an unfair and 
excessive burden of proof on them.272 Furthermore, the Court found that the Hungarian 
practice of holding asylum seekers in the transit zone can amount to the deprivation of liberty 
within the meaning of Art 5. The measure, however, has no legal basis, the rules regarding 
procedural safeguards sufficiently guaranteeing the applicants’ right to liberty are not laid 
down in Hungarian law. It follows that there has been a violation of Art 5 (1) and (4) of 
ECHR.273 Although the ECtHR found no violation of Art 3 in respect of the conditions in 
which the applicants were held in Röszke transit zone, the Court observed that the 
Government has not indicated any remedy by which the applicants could have complained 
about it: there has been a violation of Art 13 read in conjunction with Art 3 of the 
Convention.274 
Rules governing the appeal process in transit zones: by not providing adequate access to 
legal advice, given the short notice deadlines, never mind accelerated procedure, and the 
extremely limited admission, the authorities are arguably in breach of Art 13 of ECHR.275 
People waiting in pre-transit zones: in Hirsi Jamaa and others v Italy (para 74) the ECtHR 
held that whenever a state exercises effective control and authority over an individual, the 
state is under an obligation to secure the rights that are relevant to the situation. It is 
irrelevant whether the acts attributable to the state happen within or outside the territory of 
the state.276 Moreover, in M.S.S v Belgium and Greece (para 263-264), the Court found that 
the humiliating conditions coupled with ‘the prolonged uncertainty in which he has remained 
and the total lack of any prospects of his situation improving, have attained the level of 
severity required to fall within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention.’ 
‘House arrest’ of asylum seekers during criminal procedure:277 since the measure is to be 
carried out in immigration detention centres, alternatively in police jails, as HHC argued, it 
technically constitutes pre-trial detention of asylum seekers (HHC, 2015c). In Amuur v 
France (para 43) the ECtHR made it clear, that detention of asylum seekers is not arbitrary 
per se, if prescribed by and done in accordance with the law in compliance with international 
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obligations. In illuminating the non-penalisation obligation of the 1951 Geneva Convention, 
the Court implicitly prohibits practices where asylum seekers and criminals fall into the same 
category. Furthermore, the expression ‘in accordance with the law’ also refers to the ‘quality’ 
of the law: whenever domestic law authorises deprivation of liberty, it must be sufficiently 
accessible and precise (Amuur, para 50). House arrest as a measure in the context of pre-
trial detention is blurred and contradictory. Moreover, detention of asylum seekers under 
such indirect and equivocal authorisation is arguably not ‘carried out in good faith’, thus 
arbitrary and violates Art 5 of ECHR, as established in the Saadi v. United Kingdom (para 
74), let alone the ‘appropriateness’ of a police jail as the place of detention’ (Amuur para 43). 
‘8-km Rule’: on 3 October 2017, in N.D. and N.T. v. Spain the Court found that the 
applicants’ removal to Morocco amounted to a violation of Art 4 of Protocol 4 of ECHR. The 
case concerned a Malian and an Ivorian national who illegally crossed the border fence 
between Melilla and Morocco. When apprehended, they were sent back to Morocco by the 
Spanish Guardia Civil without identification and without being given the opportunity to apply 
for asylum. Although collective expulsion has been explicitly acknowledged in Art 4 of 
Protocol 4 as an absolute prohibition with no exception whatsoever, the Hungarian 
authorities pushed back tens of thousands asylum seekers in a manner identical to that of 
the fellow Spanish officers. 
 The new criminal offences criminalised migration and the asylum procedure limited 
access to refugee status determination by deterring and de facto preventing asylum seekers 
from entering Hungarian territory. Deprivation of fundamental rights has become an 
everyday reality at the borders without adequate constitutional control.278 Dublin transfers to 
Hungary had already been suspended by a number of EU member states, before the 
UNHCR requested full suspension in April 2017,279 on the basis that asylum seekers would 
have to face a real risk of treatment contrary to Art 3 of ECHR (ECRE,2016b). A razor-wired 
fence constructed to keep asylum seekers out of the territory, as well as (criminal) 
proceedings specifically tailored to the situation at hand can all be interpreted as examples 
of the wholesale rejection of existing social and legal norms, and as Nagy has shown, these 
are all “textbook examples of crimmigration” (Nagy, 2016). Moreover, not only asylum 
seekers, but also their supporters, NGOs have been portrayed and dealt with as ‘enemies’. 
A case study focusing on public attitudes towards Roma communities has recently 
established how intolerance and xenophobia can go mainstream in public discourse in 
Hungary (Vidra and Fox, 2014). Negative public perception towards migration in Hungary 
arguably peaked in 2016 (Simonovits and Bernát, 2016). The fact that the term “Gypsy 
criminal” has been taken over by the “criminal migrant” shows, as Thorleifsson phrased, 
“how old grammars of exclusion inform new fears” (Thorleifsson, 2017). The Hungarian 
Government’s ambition to define itself in opposition to liberal values is well-demonstrated by 
the new developments of migration and asylum policy. Moreover, this inflexible and 
monolithic approach to the governance of migration has gained an overwhelming social 
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acceptance and support: the Fidesz-KDNP won a landslide victory at the parliamentary 
election of April 8. 
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ANNEX I: OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
ON MIGRATION AND ASYLUM 
 
Legislation title (original / 






2003. évi LXXX. törvény a jogi 
segítségnyújtásról / Act LXXX of 







2007. évi II. törvény a harmadik 
országbeli állampolgárok 
beutazásáról és tartózkodásáról / Act 
II of 2007 on the Admission and 










12.pdf (EN) (as of 
29/05/2012) 
114/2007. (V. 24.) Korm. 
rendelet a harmadik országbeli 
állampolgárok beutazásáról és 
tartózkodásáról szóló 2007. évi II. 
Törvény végrehajtásáról / 
Government Decree 114/2007 (V. 
24.) on the Implementation of Act II 
of 2007 on the Admission and Right 
of Residence of Third-Country 









html (EN) (as of 
29/05/2012) 
2007. évi LXXX. törvény a 






072.html (EN) (as of 





301/2007. (XI. 9.) Korm. rendelet 
a menedékjogról szóló 2007. évi 
LXXX. törvény végrehajtásáról / 
Government Decree 301/2007 (XI. 
9.) on the implementation of Act 







2007. évi LXXXIX. törvény az 
államhatárról / Act LXXXIX of 2007 







29/2013. (VI. 28.) BM rendelet a 
menekültügyi őrizet végrehajtásának 
szabályairól és a menekültügyi 
óvadékról / Interior Minister Decree 
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no. 29/2013 (VI.28.) on the rules of 
execution of asylum detention and 
bail.  
2015. évi CVI. törvény a 
menedékjogról szóló 2007. évi 
LXXX. törvény módosításáról / Act 
CVI of 2015 on the amendment of 







191/2015 (VII. 21.) Korm. 
rendelet a nemzeti szinten 
biztonságosnak nyilvánított 
származási országok és biztonságos 
harmadik országok 
meghatározásáról / Government 
Decree no 191/2015 (VII. 21.) on 
safe countries of origin and safe third 
countries  









2015. évi CXXVII. törvény az 
ideiglenes biztonsági határzár 
létesítésével, valamint a migrációval 
összefüggő törvények módosításáról 
/ Act CXXVII of 2015 on the 
temporary closure of the borders and 







2015. évi CXL. törvény egyes 
törvényeknek a tömeges 
bevándorlás kezelésével összefüggő 
módosításáról / Act CXL of 2015 on 
the amendment of certain acts 








2015. évi CXLII . törvény az 
egyes törvények Magyarország 
államhatárának hatékonyabb 
védelmével és a tömeges 
bevándorlás kezelésével összefüggő 
módosításáról / Act CXLII of 2015 on 
the Amendments of Certain Acts 
Related to the More Efficient 
Protection of Hungary’s Border and 








2016. évi XXXIX. törvény egyes 
migrációs tárgyú és ezekkel 
összefüggésben más törvények 
módosításáról / Act XXXIX of 2016 
on the amendment of certain acts 
relating to migration and other 









2016. évi XCIV. Törvény a 
határon lefolytatott menekültügyi 
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törvények módosításáról / Act XCIV 
of 2016 on the amendment of acts 
necessary to the broad application of 
the border procedures 
0001.txt (HU) 
62/2016. (III. 31.) Korm. rendelet 
az egyes migrációs és menekültügyi 
tárgyú kormányrendeletek 
módosításáról / Government Decree 
no. 62/2016. (III. 31.) on the 
amendments of certain government 










113/2016. (V. 30.) Korm. 
rendelet az egyes migrációs tárgyú 
és velük összefüggésben egyes 
további kormányrendeletek 
módosításáról / Government Decree 
no. 113/2016. (V. 30.) on the 
amendments of certain government 
decrees relating to migration and 









2017. évi XX. törvény a 
határőrizeti területen lefolytatott 
eljárás szigorításával kapcsolatos 
törvények módosításáról / Act XX of 
2017 on the amendment of certain 
acts relating to the strengthening of 










70/2017. (III. 31.) Korm. rendelet a 
határőrizeti területen lefolytatott 
eljárás szigorításával kapcsolatos 
egyes kormányrendeletek 
módosításáról / Government Decree 
no. 70/2017. (III.31.) on the 
amendments of certain governmental 
decrees relating to the strengthening 
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147/2017. (VI. 12.) Korm. rendelet a 
menedékjogról szóló 2007. évi 
LXXX. törvény végrehajtásáról szóló 
301/2007. (XI. 9.) Korm. rendelet 
módosításáról / Government Decree 
no. 147/2017. (VI. 12.) on the 
amendments of Government Decree 
no. 301/2007 (XI. 9.) on the 
implementation of Act LXXX of 2007 




2017. évi CXLIII. törvény az 
egyes migrációs tárgyú törvények 
módosításáról / Act CXLIII of 2017 
on the amendments of certain acts 















































411/2017. (XII. 15.) Korm.rendelet az 
egyes migráció tárgyú és velük 
összefüggésben egyes további 
kormányrendeletek módosításáról / 
Government Decree no. 411/2017 
(XII. 15.) on the amendments of 
certain governmental decrees 
relating to migration and of other 
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ANNEX II: LIST OF AUTHORITIES INVOLVED IN 
MIGRATION GOVERNANCE 
 
Authority Tier of 
Government 
Area of competence in the 
fields of migration and asylum 
Link 
Immigration and 
Asylum Office  
Ministry 
of Interior 
Application  at the border, 




Refugee status determination, 


















Application at the border, 













Institutional Framework for immigration and asylum policies 
Ministry of Interior 
Ministry for National 
Economy 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
labour market 
access 
immigration policy, asylum policy, 
integration, EU funds, relation with 
third countries 
   
   
co-development, relation 
with third countries, visas 
- determination of the 
maximum number of work 
permits issuable to third 
country nationals 
- preparation of legislation related to 
migration and asylum 
- supervision of the OIN and the NPH 
- preparation of international agreements in 
the field of asylum and migration 




- participation in the elaboration 
of migration policy 
- coordination of the consular 
services’ work 
- educational 






National Police Headquarters 
(NPH) 
Immigration and Asylum Office (IAO) visas 
work permits 
 
- 7 regional labour  centres 
working under the 
supervision of NES are 
responsible for the issuance 
of work permits 
border control, 
removal, i llegal 
immigration, 
admission 
visas, asylum applications, illegal 
immigration, residence permit, unaccompanied 
minors, voluntary return, removal, integration, 
reception, admission 
- decisions on denial of entry - decision-making in admission procedures 
- supervision of detention in  - decision-making in asylum procedures community 
shelters - implementation of the Dublin Regulation 
- management of the Country of Origin Information System 
and database 
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Source: https://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/docs/pages/hu_organogram_dec_2017.pdf.   
 













                                               
 
280 EASO, Description of the Hungarian asylum system, May 2015, p3. Available at: 
https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/public/Description-of-the-Hungarian-asylum-system-18-
May-final.pdf; 
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ANNEX III: FLOW CHART OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
PROTECTION PROCEDURE 
 














                                               
 
281 Asylum Information Database, Country Report: Hungary, 2016, p13, Available at: 
http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/hungary/asylum-procedure/general/flow-chart. 
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ANNEX IV: THE NATIONAL CONSULTATION AND 
POSTER CAMPAIGN   
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Source: Simonovits B and Bernát A (2016) The Social Aspects of the 2015 Migration Crisis in 
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“If you come to Hungary, you can’t take the job of the Hungarian!” 
 
Source: http://shelener2.blogspot.co.uk/2015/06/ha-magyarorszagra-jossz-nem-veheted-el.html.  
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List of abbreviations: 
 
BSPs: Beneficiaries of Subsidiary Protection  
EASO: European Asylum Support Office 
ECHR: European Convention on Human Rights 
ECtHR: European Court of Human Rights 
EMN: European Migration Network 
HHC: Hungarian Helsinki Committee 
IAO: Immigration and Asylum Office (former OIN) 
OIN: Office of Immigration and Nationality 
UAM: Unaccompanied minor 
UASC: Unaccompanied asylum seeking children 
UNHCR: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
WHO: World Health Organisation 
 
